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chi banalizza toglie inconsapevolmente l’essenziale.”  
 (A. Moro) 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to Italian literature on health economics in causal 
framework. Despite the increasing awareness of ruling class that is time to enforce the 
National Health System to achieve higher efficiency levels and to make the public system 
bearable, there are few contributions in scientific literature that study Italian context, maybe 
due to scarce availability of data. 
This thesis deals with two big concerns for public regulators: cost-containment policies and 
waiting times for elective surgeries.  
The first part regards cost-containment policies and the introduction of unified authorities 
responsible for purchases of goods and provision of services at local level. The aim of the 
first part is to measure the efficacy of these new authorities in terms of costs reduction.  
The straightforward policy implication is that if the unification of local health authorities can 
help administrations to perform scale economies, this would be a successful stimulus to other 
administrations to adopt the same hint and therefore create a virtuous cycle.  
The second chapter refers to waiting times for elective surgeries, especially their relation with 
the combination of capacity constraints, demand for and supply of elective treatments. From 
a policy perspective, it is critical to establish the extent to which demand and supply respond 
to waiting time. For example, if demand is highly elastic, an exogenous increase in supply 
will only have minimal effect in reducing waiting times. 
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 In turn, this will make policymakers more reluctant to fund additional resources. Similarly, if 
supply is elastic, an exogenous increase in demand will imply that waiting time will increase 
only to a small extent.  
In both chapters we use public and free administrative data and widely known econometric 
approaches (Instrumental Variable regression and Synthetic Control) to try to establish causal 
relations between important factors in healthcare sector and try to fill the gap between 
literature on Italian health care sector and scientific production concerning other OECD and 
European Countries. 
Our findings are emerging at a sufficient extent, especially given the fact that we are not 
aware of many other studies that use administrative data in Italian context and quality of data 
is not always satisfying, even if increasing.  
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Cost-Containment Policies in Healthcare 
Sector: the example of ESTAV in Tuscany 
 
Andrea Riganti
1 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the establishment of local authorities that act as 
purchase managers in Tuscany from 2005, replacing the former Local Health Authorities. 
These new authorities are responsible for the provision of goods and for the management of 
services; they are aimed at saving money and enhancing a more efficient allocation of 
resources. In order to assess the impact in terms of cost containment we use the Synthetic 
Control Procedure to create from the donor pool of all Italian Regions and Local Health 
Authorities a weighted average that could resemble the exposed units in terms of 
expenditures before 2005, when ESTAVs were settled. We project the path of expenditures 
of these “Synthetic” units in the post-intervention period with optimally assigned weights and 
we measure differences with respect to the real path of the cost variables. We also compute 
permutations to conduct valid inference: results are appearing for most of the outcome 
variables, are robust at classical significance levels and are homogeneous across different 
Local Health Authorities. Purchases of pharmaceuticals account for high share of total 
expenses and are the ones that deserve more attention in policy discussion. In addition they 
require further analysis since the effect of the policy seems not to be in the desired direction 
for this specific item. 
1
Departments of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, University of Milano, 
Italy.   
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1 Introduction  
 
Cost-containment policies and efficient allocation of resources in healthcare sector are one of 
the major concerns in OECD countries, where a significant share of public balance is devoted 
to financing health sector, especially in publicly funded systems (Armeni and Ferrè, 2014, 
Folland et al., 2007, Feldstein, 2012).  
The Italian National Health System (NHS) is Regional based, is funded thought general 
taxation, provides full coverage in public hospitals for all citizens and is DRG-reimbursement 
type, i.e. public providers receive money according to volumes of treatment performed. 
Aging population (Lindeboom, 2006), the increase in waiting times (Siciliani and Hurst, 
2005) and the rise of unhealthy behaviours in the population (Kenkel, 2006, Cawley et al., 
2009) contribute to increase public expenditure for health. It is therefore crucial to keep 
public expense under control when these drivers are increasing, as in the Italian case.  
In the last decades Italian Regions have dealt with strict budget constraints, and have pursued 
different policies to face increasing demand for public service and avoided financial collapse 
of the system. Some of them created unified regional authorities with duties such as 
purchasing of goods and supplying of services, in order to save money by exploiting 
economies of scale and achieve efficient allocation of resources. (Furnari et al., 2016). 
When specific authorities with duties on purchases of goods and provision of services are 
established within a certain area we call this process Collaborative purchasing or 
collaborative supply chain (Marsilio et al., 2016). There is a huge literature that underlines 
theoretical framework and use empirical applications also in health sector, where efficient 
allocation of resources and collective purchasing systems are crucial to keep public expenses 
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under control. (Bovaird, 2006; Schotanus et al., 2009, Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003; Tella e 
Virolainen, 2005).  
Collaborative purchasing is in general related to cost reduction (Johnson, 1999; Muse et al., 
2010). The first underlining mechanism is the most obvious one: bigger public authorities can 
exercise more influence on the market with respect to smaller ones and can achieve cost 
containment results thanks to market power. Moreover they are able to perform scale 
economies. (Johnson, 1999; Schotanus, 2005). In addition bigger and more experienced 
public providers can reduce transaction costs (e.g. administrative costs, tender procedure 
costs), train and hire employees at a higher level of expertise and reach e higher level of 
standardisation of procedures
1
 (Marsilio et al., 2016).  
Tuscany was the first among Italian regions to create in 2005 three unified supply providers, 
followed in subsequent years by other Regions. There are seminal papers that describe 
Regional heterogeneous institutional setting (Brusoni and Marsilio, 2007, Amatucci and 
Mele, 2012) or investigate differences and similarities between Italian and EU-national 
frameworks (Marsilio and Mele, 2010), but we are not aware of papers that study in causal 
framework or econometric specification the impact that this kind of policy have determined. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of the introduction of these local authorities in 
terms of saving, giving a contribution in the existing literature.  
Despite the existing literature on causal effect is wide, it is often difficult to measure the 
impact of a policy introduction in a causal specification (Cerulli, 2015) in particular when 
sample size is small. We have a too limited number of observations to use well-studied policy 
evaluation techniques, and moreover would be very difficult to test classical hypothesis (e.g. 
                                                          
1
 In Marsilio et al., 2016, are descripted in detail some relevant aspects of possible channels for cost increase 
after a centralisation procedure.  
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parallel trend assumption) with such a heterogeneous sample. We try to solve these problems 
using the Synthetic Control Procedure (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie, Diamond and 
Hainmuller, 2010, 2011 and 2013).  Synthetic Control (SC) is a relatively new approach 
which extends the widely known and traditional counterfactual models (e.g. Difference-in-
differences) when parallel trend assumption cannot be assumed without loss of generality, by 
building a theoretical unit of observation from a convex linear combination of control units 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie, Diamond and Hainmuller, 2010, 2011 and 2013, 
Eren and Ozbeklik, 2011, Hinrichs, 2012, Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013, Xu, 2016). We 
refer to the exposed unit as the one that experience the treatment or the introduction of the 
policy. The idea behind this model is that a weighted average of unexposed (or control) units 
based on their covariates would resemble in an appropriate way the exposed unit and in turn 
produce a counterfactual unit comparable with the original one. 
SC method has been mainly used to evaluate the consequence of natural disasters (Cavallo et 
al., 2013, Coffman and Noy, 2012, Du Pont IV and Noy, 2012, Lynham, Noy and Page, 
2012), where the natural disaster is viewed as random and unpredictable shocks happening in 
a single or a limited number of countries. Due to non-comparability across countries SC 
method is adequate to estimate the effect of a policy change that cannot be anticipated, as in 
the natural disaster case, combining units with a set of control weights aiming to reproduce 
the exposed region. In later extension of SC method, it has been used to evaluate effects on 
wage compensation for professionals of health (Okeke, 2009), universal coverage reform on 
health outcomes (Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014), insurance market reform (Lo, 2013) and 
minimum wage studies (Dube and Zipperer, 2013).  
Given the large heterogeneity across Italian Regions, SC procedure seems to be optimal since 
it allows us to obtain an unbiased estimate of the treated – or exposed – unit and to measure 
the effect through a difference between real values and pointwise estimates. We therefore use 
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the SC method to assign weights to the unexposed units in the sample so that they could 
resemble Tuscany before the policy was introduced and then use these weights to build a 
theoretical prevision of Tuscany's expenditures after policy implementation. We can thus 
compare the theoretical Tuscany with real values of expenses and through differences 
between these two outcomes measure the real policy effect.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 and 3 highlight some key elements for the 
Italian Health care sector and the type of data we use. Section 4 describes in detail SC 
procedure, whilst Section 5 articulates descriptive and inferential results. Section 6 concludes 
and discusses some policy implications.   
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2 Italian and Tuscany Health System  
 
Italian constitution states that “The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the 
individual and as a collective interest, and guarantees free medical care to the indigent.
2” 
The Italian NHS was founded in 1978 and the Ministry of Health is nowadays assisted by 
some internal agencies, which aims are to safeguard human health, workers at their 
workplace, coordination of NHS, veterinary medicine and food security.  
In particular the Ministry fixes general rules for preventive medicine, diagnoses, care and 
rehabilitation for both people and animals. It also monitors Regions and Local Health 
Authorities (L.H.A.s) conducting clinical research in health care sector.  
The Italian Healthcare system is publicly-funded through general and regional taxation and is 
a DRG-type system, which means that public providers receive money according to several 
different factors e.g. volumes, number of performed intervention, quality and complexity of 
the provided care, waiting times and target achievements
3
.  
Italy is divided into nineteen Regions and two autonomous provinces: in 2001 a 
Constitutional reform decentralised healthcare sector at regional level and gave regions the 
freedom to choose the type of healthcare model, generating great variability in institutional 
arrangements across regions. From now on we therefore consider Autonomous Provinces of 
Trento and Bolzano as Regions since they have the same duties and rights in healthcare 
sector other Regions have. Regional healthcare systems have to meet the so-called Essential 
Levels of Assistance (L.E.A.) annually defined and updated by the Ministry of Health. 
Regional administrations are responsible for strategic planning (e.g. building new hospitals or 
agreements with Universities), organisational scheme, resources allocation strategy, 
                                                          
2
 Art.32 Italian Constitution  
3
 Legislative Decree n.300/1999 and subsequent modifications 
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budgetary policy, regulatory scheme between private and public sector, co-payment rules for 
citizens. Heterogeneity in regional policies has emerged driven by differences in co-payment 
schemes, unified booking centres and promotion of private health insurance, providing a 
fragmented framework with regional disparities. 
Regional administrations settle within each region LHAs and define their jurisdictional 
territory. LHAs depend from Regional government in terms of funding and control, and are 
local providers for health care, prevention campaigns, general practitioners (GP) provision 
and veterinary medicine.  
The total number of Italian LHAs has reduced from 227 in 1997 to 136 in 2013. Some 
Regions (Valle d’Aosta, Autonomous Province of Trento, Autonomous Province of Bolzano, 
Marche and Molise) have only one LHA operating within its district at the end of 2013. Two 
regions, Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia, have a health governance structure disaggregated 
at sub-provincial level. The remaining Regions have defined LHA boundaries coinciding on 
average with Provincial ones. 
Moreover, within each LHA operate in general more than one public hospital; regional 
administrations are allowed by law to decide whether hospitals are subject to regional or local 
control through LHAs. In the former, hospitals are called Hospital Authorities (HAs), depend 
from Regional Administration in terms of funding and are free from territorial duties, whilst 
in the latter they are not autonomous from LHAs responsible for the site hospitals are 
operating. There is huge heterogeneity across Regions in the definition of the regulatory 
scheme between public and private hospitals, LHAs and HAs which reflects not only 
heterogeneity in internal need of the population, but also different approaches in the provision 
of care. 
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In the last decades reduction in transfers from national government to regional 
administrations have caused Regions dealing with strictly balance constraints which has in 
turn determined heterogeneous reduction strategies of expenses between administrations, 
seeking of a more efficient allocation of resources, and a decrease in transfers from Regional 
Administrations to LHAs and HAs. The most commonly used policy was local unit reduction 
and the creation of specific authorities with responsibilities in cost containment and efficient 
allocations of resources.  
Until 2005 in Tuscany were operating twelve LHAs until regional government decided to 
appoint to three territorial authorities LHAs duties and tasks on administration, accounting, 
provision of goods and services, management. These were called Enti per i Servizi Tecnico 
Amministrativi di Area Vasta – ESTAV4, i.e. Authorities for Technical and Administrative 
Services for Extended Area and act as commission centres in behalf of Local Health 
Authorities and Teaching Hospitals. Moreover, they are subject to all national and regional 
disposals that regulate purchases of the Authorities themselves. The aim of regional 
administration was to improve quality of care and increase free access to care for residents 
through corruption contrast, efficient allocation of resources, scale economies. 
In order to simplify the notation and to stress the idea that ESTAVs are nothing more than 
bigger LHAs operating on bigger portion of regional area, we indicate the North-West 
Tuscany ESTAV as the new “LHA of Pisa”, the Central Tuscany ESTAV as the new “LHA 
of Florence” and the South-East ESTAV as the new “LHA of Siena”.   
                                                          
4
 The three ESTAVs namely are: North-West Tuscany (former LHAs of Massa – Carrara, Livorno, Lucca, 
Viareggio, Pisa and HA of the city of Pisa), Central Tuscany (former LHAs of Prato, Pistoia, Florence, Empoli, 
HA Careggi and HA Meyer) and South-East Tuscany (former LHAs of Grosseto, Siena, Arezzo and HA of the 
city of Siena) 
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3 Data  
 
We collect balance sheets of LHAs and HAs from Ministry of Health databases
5
. Some 
LHAs are settled at sub-provincial level i.e. they are in general smaller than administrative 
Italian provinces. Moreover, as detailed in Section 2, almost all regions changed their 
territorial structure (i.e. aggregation process) over the time span considered. Given the big 
heterogeneity across and within regions, combined with the fact that different LHAs and HAs 
can coexist within each province, we would ideally aggregate data at provincial level in order 
to have an administrative unit of observation and availability of covariates. There are 
although few cases in which LHAs are bigger than the correspondent province and essentially 
are the cases of regional LHAs: in such cases we opt for a Regional aggregation of 
covariates. In addition there are few other cases in which administrative provinces are smaller 
than the correspondent LHA, (e.g. in Sardegna and for provinces of Bari and Barletta in 
Puglia) and we opt for LHA aggregation of provincial covariates. We can thus refer to unit of 
observations as LHAs without any loss of generality, since the healthcare sector building 
block are by definition Local Health Authorities, irrespectively by Regional or Provincial 
aggregation. In Appendix A1 we provide the definition of our unit of observation. 
Balance sheets are available in Ministry of Health database from 1997 to 2013. Thus, we sum 
balance items for all LHAs and HAs within each LHA (or unit of observation as detailed 
above), obtaining a panel dataset of 1564 observations (92 units for 17 years) for each 
expenditure item. Balances were made comparable with some reclassification procedures 
since 1997. Up to 2013 five different versions of balances were promoted with different 
codifications. 
                                                          
5
http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1314&area=programmazioneSanitariaLea&
menu=dati.   
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We focus on the categories of expenses related to: (i) Pharmaceutical goods, such as 
pharmaceuticals, blood sacks, blood-derived, low-calorie, haemodialysis, vaccines and 
chemical products, medical devices, prosthetic, diagnostic and surgical materials; (ii) 
Veterinary goods and vaccines for animals; (iii) Foodstuff goods and food services; (iv) 
Living goods and services, i.e. wardrobe and cleaning goods and services; (v) Combustibles, 
carburant, propellants, lubricants and heating services; (vi) IT, stationery materials and data 
management services; (vii) Maintenance goods and services.  
Every item is multiplied for a constant-per-year coefficient according to the year in order to 
have all variables expressed in PPP Euro at year 2010 prices. In addition our outcome 
variables are standardized by population dimension and logs are taken. 
From ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics) we derive and include population 
distribution as potential shifters of public expenditure i.e. proportion of under 14, over 65 and 
over 80 years old on the total number of residents, population density (inhabitants per 
squared kilometre) and average number of residents per municipality
6
.  
From Ministry of Finance
7
 database we obtain the GDP per capita for every region in any 
given year of observation. We also calculate the proportion of non-taxpayers on the total 
number of residents aged between 15 and 64 years old as measure of people at the expenses 
of regional population, since official statistics for unemployment rate are not available at 
provincial level from 1997.  
The Ministry of Health
8
 annually publishes the Annual Report of Hospital Discharges from 
which we compute some volumes of treatment variables. These variables are available at 
regional level and we are able to standardise them according to the population dimension for 
                                                          
6
 Relevant data can be fount in dati.istat.it in Population and Families section.  
7
 http://www.finanze.gov.it/opencms/it/statistiche-fiscali/ 
8
 http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?id=1237&area=ricoveriOspedalieri&menu=vuoto 
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each unit of observation. These variables are the total number of hospital discharges and the 
total number of days in hospital for elective patients but also for rehabilitation and long-stay 
patients. We also include the average stay, measured in days, as potential covariate.  
Lastly, we include quality of care indicators provided by the Ministry of Health and available 
at Regional level. We include the average stay standardised by complexity of treatment, the 
case mix variable to control for severity of admissions, the share of complications after 
surgeries on the total number of surgeries performed as a measure of quality and a 
performance indicator. Ideally we would have more quality and efficiency indicators but 
unfortunately data are not available for the years considered at disaggregated level. We also 
add the standardised-by-complexity performance index to be able to compare different 
Regions over time. 
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4 Econometric Specification  
4.1 Synthetic Control Procedure 
We use the Synthetic Control Procedure (SC) as presented in Abadie and Gardeazabal. 
(2003), Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) to measure the effect of the settlement of ESTAVs in 
Tuscany regional healthcare sector in terms of cost containment.  
SC was proposed to compare a single “treated” or “affected by the policy” unit and a set of 
“non-treated” or “non-affected” units, and it can be considered an extension of Difference-in-
Difference method to compare one unit against a group of untreated units. From now on we 
use the term “treated” to indicate any unit that have experienced policy change (i.e. the 
introduction of ESTAV and “untreated” as the remaining ones. We consider one single 
ESTAV – or LHA – as exposed unit and all other untreated units in our dataset as unit in the 
donor pool. We find the weights for the single treated LHA as a convex linear combination of 
untreated LHAs in the donor pool in pre-intervention period and we apply those weights to 
the post-intervention period, de facto computing a theoretical trajectory for the outcome 
variable if “any intervention would have occurred” or more precisely, what would have 
happened to LHA expenditures if any intervention or policy change happened. 
We thus compare the theoretical LHA outcome path, built as a linear combination of past 
values of other units, with the real values of the outcome variable. If it is possible to measure 
a positive difference between the theoretical LHA and the real one in terms of the outcome 
(cost) variable after the policy was introduced, we conclude that the policy intervention have 
caused a reduction in expenditures, so the policy has reached the predetermined goal. Vice 
versa, if there is a negative difference between the theoretical and real outcome variable, the 
policy has just worsened the situation. We expect that the introduction of LHAs has lowered 
the aggregate level of expenses in a single area, i.e. we expect to find positive differences 
between the theoretical and real values.  
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We consider     units where only the first one is exposed to policy intervention. We 
consider   as the total number of years of observation, with                 being the 
number of years in the pre-intervention period, and               the years after the 
policy implementation. Let   denote the cost variable, measured over the time span 
considered for all units in the sample and affected by the policy change in year  . Suppose we 
can observe    
  the outcome variable under any policy intervention and     
 the outcome 
variable after policy introduction. For every unit unaffected by the policy, but also for unit   
before policy implementation,    
     
     . For unit 1 and after policy introduction in year 
  we can only observe    
 . The SC procedure aims at measuring the impact of the policy for 
any given year after year k for the affected unit from the difference between the real value 
and what would have happened in absence of treatment as follows:  
       
       
     
          
         
Where        
     
  is the effect of the policy introduction and     is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in presence of the new policy and 0 otherwise.  
     
                 
           
  
It follows that            
     
     
 . We do not observe the outcome in absence of 
intervention for unit 1    
 , indeed we observe        
  . Thus we need to provide an 
estimate of     to assess the policy change.  
It is straightforward that     has a causal interpretation and denote the impact of the policy 
introduction, since it represents the difference between what has really happened and what 
would have happened in absence of the policy.  
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As in Abadie et al. (2010) we define         as the number of post-intervention periods 
and we let    be a        vector of cost outcome for the exposed unit. Let    be a    
   vector of   potential exogenous linear combination control variables measured on the 
affected unit by the policy unit and let       
      be a            vector of outcome 
values and linear combination of exogenous shifters for the affected unit. Similarly we define 
   as a        matrix of outcome variables for   unaffected units in pre-intervention period, 
and    as a        vector of   potential exogenous linear combination control variables for 
the same set of control units. We can thus define       
      as a            matrix of 
outcomes and exogenous covariates. We can estimate                as the       
vectors which minimise  
                              
where   is a       symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix. We minimize this 
difference with constraints      
   
    and        . 
Let us note that  can influence minimisation procedure.   is chosen so that it minimizes the 
Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE) of the synthetic control estimator. Once    and 
   are chosen, we can use the derived weights to estimate  
    
     
    
   
   
 
with           and obtain  
         
     
          
         
       
       
                      
The estimated average effect of the policy is given by the mean of all effects across all years: 
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4.2 Inference and Multiple Treated Units 
Following Cavallo et al. (2013) we use permutation techniques to compute significance 
values for the estimates SC procedure provide. We routinely apply the SC procedure to all 
units in the donor pool assuming that each of them had experienced in year   the same policy 
implementation our previous-affected unit did. We obtain   SC       vectors of estimates, 
one for each unit. These vectors are nothing but the effects that would have been obtained by 
having randomly assigned the policy to the sample units along the time span considered. We 
calculate the proportion of effects that overcome the estimated effect for the affected unit 
over the total     number of effects for each year considered. We interpret this proportion 
as a p-value, as in the following: 
                 
             
   
   
 
 
where      is the estimated effect for the generic   region at time            when the 
policy intervention is randomly assigned to county  .  
We draw inference on       the average effect on the entire post-intervention period for the 
affected unit. We consider, for each year   after policy introduction, the total number of 
possible “placebo” averages     and we calculate the empirical p-value reported as    i.e. the 
proportion of “placebo” averages that exceeds the estimated average effect.  
                
             
 
   
 
 
Where  denotes the total number of possible placebo averages             and   denotes 
any possible realisation obtained from any combination of placebo effects.  
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As proposed by Krief et al. (2015) following Abadie et al. (2010) we extend our analysis 
considering the fact that we have three treated units which belong to the same region and the 
treated units might be aggregated into a single one. We use the same SC procedure explained 
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 considering as unit of observation the whole region and compare it 
with all other regions. This exercise is useful to assess robustness of our estimates and 
provides general effect of a Region versus the others, even if using aggregate data prevents us 
from using robust inferential techniques.  
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5 Empirical Results  
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
We calculate per capita expenditures for every item dividing the total amount spent by public 
providers within each LHA by the average number of residents in each territory at the 
beginning and at the end of each year
9
.  
Tables 1.a and 1.b show outcome cost variables averaged over different time periods for 
Tuscany (a) and a mean of all Italian Regions (b). The overall per-capita expenditure has 
dramatically increased for Italian Regions from about 200 euros in 1997-1999 triennium to 
approximately 335 euros in 2012-2013. The magnitude of this increase is similar to the one 
experienced in Tuscany, where, from 220 per capita euros in 1997-1999, an increase occurs 
which leads to a per capita expenditure equal to 416 euros for 2009-2011 compensated by a 
significant reduction in 2012-2013, where the average cost per capita is about 385 euros.  
Pharmaceuticals are the major determinant of overall per capita goods dynamics since they 
account for at least two third of total per capita expenditures in every time interval considered 
and their relative weight has increased over time. It follows that per capita paths are mostly 
driven by changes in pharmaceutical per capita expenditures.  
Per capita expenditures for maintenance goods and services are, on average, constant over 
time both for Tuscany (27 euros per inhabitant in 1997-1999 and 35 euros in 2012-2013) and 
for the average of all Italian Regions (25 euros in 1997-1999 and 36 in 2012-2013), showing 
in both cases a small reduction between the last two intervals. Living goods and materials 
show a similar path in terms of a small increase in both Italian and Tuscany case. Foodstuff 
goods and food-related services are on average quite constant over time in Tuscany and show 
a little increase on average for Italian Regions. IT, combustibles and veterinary goods are the 
                                                          
9
 Cost variables are expressed in Euros with reference year 2010. 
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less expensive and show a small but constant decrease in per capita euros in Tuscany. 
Veterinary goods are also decreasing in the Italian average, whilst combustibles are constant 
over time and IT goods and services are somewhat increasing.  
Tables 1 (a) - (d) represent three-years averages of per capita expenditures for LHA of 
Florence (a), Pisa (b), Siena (c) and an un-weighted average of all units included in the 
sample (d), i.e. an average of all Italian LHAs. There are small differences within LHAs in 
Tuscany in terms of per capita costs at the beginning and at the end of the period considered 
and the comparison with overall Italian average of per capita expenditures across all LHAs 
reveals us that public providers in Tuscany spend more than the national average. As for the 
analysis at regional level, pharmaceuticals drive the aggregate cost and reflect the Tuscany 
over-expenses if compared with the average of local units. Also goods and services for 
maintenance and for food are on average higher in Tuscany rather than in other units, even if 
with different rates.  
We can conclude that expenditures experienced an increase over time from 1997 to 2013, and 
this increase can be identified irrespectively at Regional or at local level. Pharmaceuticals are 
the major driver of public expenditures for goods and services and show a common trend 
between different units. Other items have a lower weight on the determining of total per 
capita expenditure but show interesting different path over years and across units.  
In Appendix A2 we report tables for descriptive statistics on covariates such as population 
dimension (Tables A2.1a and A2.1b). In terms of number of residents, both Tuscany and 
LHAs operating in Tuscany territory are on average bigger than national averages for 
Regions and for LHAs. Moreover we can observe that population has increased over time and 
in particular Tuscany experienced a higher population growth rate since the difference was 
about 785 thousands in 1997-1999 and increased up to 845 thousands in 2012-2013.  
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As stated in previous section population composition is one of the most powerful driving 
force for utilisation of health services, since the elderly (or super–elderly) and the youngest 
deserve more care and as a consequence are more likely to demand for health care services. 
In Tables A2.2a – A2.2d (Appendix A2) we can see that the both the proportion of people 
who are over 65 years old the proportion of over 80 years old are higher in Tuscany LHAs 
than the Italian average, even if this difference is decreasing over time. In general, the 
proportion of elderly and the proportion of super elderly are increasing over time and they 
represent significant share of population which in turn can have an important effect for 
expenditure increase. Accordingly with this result, proportion of under 14 is decreasing in 
Italian LHAs whilst is increasing over time for Tuscany. Population density and the average 
number of residents per municipality are constant over time for all units considered. We also 
report in Tables A2.2e and A2.2f population composition and dynamics for Tuscany and 
other Italian Regions and autonomous provinces.  
Wages for doctors and medical staff standardised by population dimension account (Table 
A2.3a) for 460 euros per LHA resident in 2012-2013 in Italy, wages for administrative 
personnel about one tenth (44 euros per capita), wages for professional service employees 
less than 3 euros per capita and wages for technical employees about 65 euros per capita. All 
these labour variables have followed similar path from 1997 to 2013 and are substantially 
lower than per capita expenditures for Tuscany LHA residents (Tables A2.3b-d). This 
difference is exactly the same if we compare whole Tuscany with the average of Italian 
Regions (Tables A2.3e and A2.3f). Wages of doctors and medical staff are in general defined 
by national contract and as a consequence we can either conclude that in Tuscany there are 
more doctors per residents or these doctors are paid to work more. In both cases we can 
assume a higher endowment of labour in Tuscany with respect to Italian average. 
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Tuscany (and its sub-territories in which LHAs operates) is generally richer and with lower 
level of unemployment if compared to other Italian Regions. Detailed results are in tables 
A2.4 and A2.5 (Appendix A2).  
We also report utilisation rates (A2.6, Appendix A2) and complexity performance indices 
(Table A2.7, Appendix A2) available at regional level to control for providers heterogeneity 
and for quality differences. 
26 
 
Table 1 (a): Pharmaceuticals 
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
113,49 39,5 
 
136,25 44,4 
 
171,26 53,7 
 
199,03 56,9 
 
222,36 66,7 
 
220,34 72,9 
Florence 1 
 
153,91 13,1 
 
203,35 16,1 
 
274,17 24,8 
 
302,05 11,7 
 
328,55 1,9 
 
310,79 3,6 
Pisa 1 
 
150,63 12,3 
 
199,78 18,8 
 
252,76 18,1 
 
289,24 7,1 
 
314,35 3,7 
 
285,74 2,4 
Siena 1   139,22 10,7   163,96 39,2   240,97 22,1   276,72 12,0   297,73 5,7   275,65 3,2 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for pharmaceutical goods and services standardised by resident population 
dimension. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two 
years. Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
 
Table 1 (b): Veterinary goods and services 
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
1,04 3,5 
 
0,42 1,1 
 
0,15 0,2 
 
0,14 0,2 
 
0,13 0,1 
 
0,13 0,2 
Florence 1 
 
0,04 0,0 
 
0,02 0,0 
 
0,03 0,0 
 
0,02 0,0 
 
0,01 0,0 
 
0,01 0,0 
Pisa 1 
 
0,70 1,0 
 
0,06 0,0 
 
0,06 0,0 
 
0,03 0,0 
 
0,02 0,0 
 
0,01 0,0 
Siena 1   0,08 0,1   0,06 0,0   0,08 0,0   0,08 0,0   0,08 0,0   0,03 0,0 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for veterinary goods and services standardised by resident population 
dimension. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two 
years. Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
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Table 1 (c): Foodstuff goods and services  
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
11,18 3,8 
 
12,16 4,5 
 
12,70 5,0 
 
13,45 5,4 
 
13,85 5,3 
 
13,06 5,2 
Florence 1 
 
9,46 0,7 
 
11,49 0,6 
 
12,88 0,3 
 
11,83 0,8 
 
12,55 0,3 
 
12,38 0,2 
Pisa 1 
 
13,99 0,4 
 
16,00 0,6 
 
16,89 0,4 
 
15,07 0,6 
 
15,23 0,3 
 
13,22 1,2 
Siena 1   14,04 1,0   14,41 1,5   15,60 0,1   14,95 0,1   15,76 0,4   14,62 0,6 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for foodstuff goods and services standardised by resident population 
dimension. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two 
years. Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
 
Table 1 (d): Living goods and services  
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
19,70 11,3 
 
22,66 11,3 
 
25,40 11,7 
 
28,12 11,4 
 
29,79 11,1 
 
28,80 11,1 
Florence 1 
 
22,62 0,2 
 
30,94 3,5 
 
37,19 0,8 
 
36,61 0,9 
 
38,37 0,5 
 
35,69 2,1 
Pisa 1 
 
23,23 1,5 
 
26,99 1,9 
 
32,18 0,7 
 
33,34 0,3 
 
37,02 1,8 
 
37,37 2,1 
Siena 1   20,89 1,1   25,50 3,0   35,06 3,5   40,00 0,1   39,95 0,1   38,32 1,0 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for living goods and services standardised by resident population dimension. 
Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. 
Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
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Table 1 (e): Combustibles  
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
5,63 3,9 
 
4,24 3,9 
 
3,47 3,5 
 
3,57 3,9 
 
3,11 3,9 
 
3,04 4,0 
Florence 1 
 
6,57 0,4 
 
5,22 0,2 
 
4,12 0,4 
 
2,36 1,6 
 
0,77 0,0 
 
0,87 0,1 
Pisa 1 
 
1,89 1,0 
 
1,62 0,2 
 
1,96 0,5 
 
1,62 0,5 
 
1,04 0,1 
 
1,08 0,2 
Siena 1   7,13 0,7   5,55 1,1   2,59 1,2   1,55 0,1   1,38 0,1   1,55 0,1 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for combustibles standardised by resident population dimension. Variables 
are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Variables are 
expressed in 2010 Euros. 
 
Table 1 (f): Information Technologies (IT)  
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
4,48 3,4 
 
5,37 4,0 
 
6,48 5,6 
 
6,90 5,8 
 
6,77 6,0 
 
6,46 5,9 
Florence 1 
 
6,49 0,3 
 
5,51 0,6 
 
4,86 0,6 
 
4,73 0,2 
 
4,09 0,4 
 
3,04 0,4 
Pisa 1 
 
5,22 1,1 
 
8,92 1,0 
 
6,59 1,3 
 
5,25 0,1 
 
4,71 0,6 
 
3,47 0,8 
Siena 1   3,97 0,1   4,35 0,5   4,05 0,4   3,31 0,4   4,39 0,2   3,35 0,5 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for IT goods and services standardised by resident population dimension. 
Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. 
Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
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Table 1 (g): Maintenance  
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
23,51 9,9 
 
24,30 9,2 
 
26,34 9,7 
 
29,02 10,9 
 
31,48 13,9 
 
31,61 14,7 
Florence 1 
 
27,33 0,5 
 
29,80 0,6 
 
29,04 1,6 
 
31,67 0,2 
 
33,54 0,8 
 
32,39 1,1 
Pisa 1 
 
26,53 0,6 
 
31,73 2,4 
 
34,57 3,0 
 
32,68 1,5 
 
37,23 2,1 
 
37,89 0,5 
Siena 1   26,43 0,6   24,51 6,0   31,81 2,5   35,45 0,3   35,85 0,2   37,66 0,5 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for maintenance goods and services standardised by resident population 
dimension. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two 
years. Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
 
Table 1 (h): Total  
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
LHA n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
179,02 59,4 
 
205,40 64,6 
 
245,82 74,4 
 
280,22 79,1 
 
307,50 90,2 
 
303,44 96,8 
Florence 1 
 
226,42 12,9 
 
286,33 18,8 
 
362,28 24,5 
 
389,26 10,0 
 
417,88 2,7 
 
395,16 7,5 
Pisa 1 
 
222,19 12,7 
 
285,10 23,9 
 
345,02 20,3 
 
377,23 5,3 
 
409,60 4,6 
 
378,78 7,1 
Siena 1   211,77 10,5   238,32 50,8   330,16 26,8   372,06 12,3   395,14 6,0   371,19 4,9 
Notes: Euros spent by Italian and Tuscany Local Health Authorities for total goods and total provision of services standardised by resident 
population dimension. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends 
only two years. Variables are expressed in 2010 Euros. 
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5.2 Synthetic Control: a brief reminder 
Sections 5.3-5.5 contain results for Synthetic Control procedures for LHA of Florence 
(Section 5.3), Pisa (5.4) and Siena (5.5). For each LHA and for each cost variable we 
estimate a separate model assigning weights to Italian LHAs in the donor pool in order to 
minimise differences between outcome trajectory before 2005 and the weighted linear 
combination of outcome variables of others LHAs. We therefore apply the same weights to 
outcome variables measured at Local level after 2005, obtaining pointwise estimates of what 
would have happened to relevant outcome variable in absence of ESTAV creation. Weights 
are assigned to LHAs but also to relevant variables (W* and V* matrices, section 4.1). To 
compute our estimates we include all Italian LHAs with the only exclusion of the ones that 
operate in Tuscany, since they have experienced the same cost-containment policy in 2005 
and this would violate the assumption that units in donor pool do not have to experience the 
same policy. In section 5.6 we use the same model to estimate results for Tuscany and 
compare outcome variables with a weighted combination of outcome variable themselves in 
aggregated Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces.  
The structure of each of the following (5.3-5.6) sections is the same: is shown a table which 
compare simple averages over years of covariates in the pre-treatment period for the relevant 
LHA, and a weighted average (weights are assigned as reported in Section 4.1) of covariates 
measured at LHA level separately for each outcome variable. These tables are useful to 
investigate whether the (weighted) average of covariates in pre-treatment period is 
reproducing original values in LHA of interest.  
In addition we provide for each LHA and for each balance two different graphical 
representations: the left-hand one represents the real path of expenditures (blue line) with the 
SC convex combination of LHAs (red line), while the right-hand one shows differences 
31 
 
between the two mentioned. We expect the two lines are overlapping in both figures before 
2005 and are diverging after.  
In Appendix A3 we also provide tables with real and SC estimates from which we obtain 
these figures.  
 
5.3 Synthetic Control: Florence 
Table 2 reports predictor balance of covariates. In the first column we calculate the 1997-
2005 average of covariates for LHA of Florence so the real means over time for the 
covariates included. In the following columns we report the average outcomes weighted with 
SC weights in the same time interval for the units included in each donor pool. As we have 
previously noticed the pre-treatment goodness of fit is on average quite good for each 
variable. Good balance between covariates and real averages in the interval 1997-2005 
reveals that SC estimate is adequate to represent LHA of Florence.  
Figure 1 represents pharmaceutical cost variable: we note an unexpected effect, since the real 
trajectory is on average above the estimated SC line. It seems that the policy caused an 
increase in pharmaceutical expenditures that we wouldn’t have observed without policy 
implementation.  
Figure 2 represents purchases of veterinary goods. Due to non-constant trend in pre-treatment 
period the goodness of fit is too poor and the SC estimates have poor predictive effects.  
Foodstuff goods and services are represented in Figure 3. The pre-policy introduction series 
is perfectly matched by the SC linear combination of LHAs, since real and synthetic lines 
coincide in left-hand part of the Figure, i.e. their difference is zero. The effect of the policy is 
positive in the first years while is weaker in the last part of the time span considered.  
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Albeit the difference between the real and the Synthetic lines is negligible for living goods 
and services (Figure 4) there is no policy effect. As we can note from right-hand part of 
Figure 4 the difference between the two lines seems random and there is no clear indication 
on any effect.  
There is a significant cost decrease for combustibles et similia as we can see from Figure 5. 
The pre-policy real line is very well approximated by the SC combination and from 2006 
there is a substantial reduction in terms of costs, moreover the trend is decreasing also in the 
weighted combination of LHAs. 
The discrepancy between real and synthetic lines is monotonically increasing over time for IT 
goods and services as we can see in Figure 6. The synthetic line is quite flat after 2006 but the 
real trajectory is dramatically decreasing and reveals us that ESTAV introduction had a 
positive effect on this variable.  
For what concern maintenance goods and services (Figure 7) the pre-treatment fitting is poor 
and conclusions can not be strong as previous outcomes.  
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Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
  
Florence 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Veterinary 
 
Food 
 
Living 
 
Combustibles 
 
IT 
 
Maintenance 
 Acute admissions  
 
19.46 
 
18.76 
 
17.86 
 
18.61 
 
18.25 
 
17.91 
 
18.20 
 
18.16 
 Rehabilitation admissions 
 
15.29 
 
15.08 
 
13.96 
 
14.87 
 
14.55 
 
13.73 
 
14.10 
 
13.21 
 Long-care term admissions 
 
11.18 
 
13.45 
 
11.61 
 
11.77 
 
10.45 
 
10.72 
 
11.35 
 
10.50 
 Acute total days 
 
21.31 
 
20.57 
 
19.68 
 
20.41 
 
20.03 
 
19.65 
 
20.01 
 
19.97 
 Long-care total days 
 
14.88 
 
17.80 
 
15.48 
 
15.96 
 
13.69 
 
14.41 
 
15.32 
 
13.55 
 Rehabilitation total days 
 
18.47 
 
18.25 
 
17.19 
 
18.08 
 
17.61 
 
16.80 
 
17.34 
 
15.94 
 Prop. over 80 y.o. 
 
5.65 
 
5.99 
 
5.63 
 
4.55 
 
5.42 
 
4.19 
 
4.56 
 
4.72 
 Prop. over 65 y.o. 
 
21.77 
 
22.90 
 
22.11 
 
19.20 
 
21.39 
 
18.03 
 
18.61 
 
19.60 
 Prop. under 14 y.o. 
 
11.85 
 
11.40 
 
11.80 
 
13.70 
 
12.10 
 
14.93 
 
14.81 
 
13.71 
 Share of non-working people 
 
24.60 
 
22.46 
 
23.50 
 
29.62 
 
24.15 
 
31.11 
 
24.62 
 
28.53 
 Average stay 
 
7.48 
 
6.92 
 
7.31 
 
7.09 
 
7.13 
 
6.76 
 
6.95 
 
7.37 
 Performance Index 
 
0.98 
 
0.96 
 
0.98 
 
1.02 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.99 
 
1.03 
 Case mix control 
 
1.10 
 
1.04 
 
1.08 
 
1.01 
 
1.06 
 
0.99 
 
0.97 
 
1.02 
 Share of complications 
 
32.13 
 
30.87 
 
32.26 
 
28.31 
 
30.09 
 
28.70 
 
28.28 
 
31.19 
 GDP per capita 
 
14482.17 
 
15503.34 
 
12904.61 
 
12592.56 
 
14780.43 
 
11090.21 
 
13349.55 
 
12474.30 
 Residents  /Municipalities 
 
9.91 
 
9.07 
 
8.86 
 
9.02 
 
9.02 
 
8.53 
 
9.15 
 
8.56 
 Population density 
 
5.69 
 
5.09 
 
5.38 
 
5.64 
 
5.77 
 
4.63 
 
5.07 
 
4.86 
 Medical wages p.c.  
 
13.04 
 
13.11 
 
12.87 
 
12.86 
 
12.94 
 
12.91 
 
13.02 
 
13.00 
 Professional sector wages p.c.  
 
7.88 
 
7.97 
 
7.23 
 
7.31 
 
7.68 
 
7.31 
 
7.60 
 
7.34 
 Technical sector wages p.c.  
 
11.27 
 
11.32 
 
10.86 
 
11.18 
 
11.22 
 
11.29 
 
11.40 
 
11.20 
 Administrative sector wages p.c.  
 
10.71 
 
10.85 
 
10.56 
 
10.56 
 
10.59 
 
10.62 
 
10.86 
 
10.66 
  Table 2: averages 1997-2005 for LHA of Florence for covariates in the first column; weighted averages with SC weights for each model in the following columns.  
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Figure 1: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Pharmaceuticals. LHA of Florence.  
Figure 2: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Veterinary goods. LHA of Florence. 
Figure 3: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Food goods and services. LHA of Florence.  
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Figure 4: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Living goods and serivces. LHA of Florence.  
Figure 5: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Combustibles, carburant, lubricants. LHA of Florence.  
Figure 6: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: IT services and goods. LHA of Florence.  
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Figure 7: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Maintenance goods and services. LHA of Florence. 
 
5.4 Synthetic Control: Pisa  
As for LHA of Florence, also balance predictors for covariates for LHA of Pisa (Table 3) 
reveal that on average covariates are correctly balanced in estimation procedures for all 
models.  
Figure 8 represents SC estimates for total expenditures for pharmaceuticals in the LHA of 
Pisa. There is no substantial effect of the policy, i.e. the real trajectory is adequately 
estimated by LHAs weighted average before 2005. After 2006 there is no policy effect since 
the differences between the two lines seem to randomly be around zero. In other words 
differences between real and synthetic trajectories are irrelevant before policy introduction 
whilst post-policy years show an effect that is opposite to cost containment.  
In Figure 9 we find results for the cost variable that regards veterinary materials. Beneath a 
low pre-policy fit there are small evidences that the creation of ESTAV have helped LHA of 
Pisa to save money in this specific item. The effect is weak.  
If we consider the difference between the real and the synthetic line for purchase of foodstuff 
goods and services (Figure 10), we can see that there is a small policy effect. Nevertheless 
pre-policy fit is quite good.  
1
0
.2
1
0
.3
1
0
.4
1
0
.5
1
0
.6
(l
o
g
 o
f)
 p
e
r-
th
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 E
u
ro
s
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
Real Firenze Synthetic Firenze
Dash line: 2005, policy implementation
Florence, 1997-2013
Real and projected outcomes: Maintenance 
-.
1
5
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
(l
o
g
 o
f)
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
 i
n
 p
e
r-
th
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 E
u
ro
s
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
Dash line: 2005, policy implementation
Florence, 1997-2013
Maintenance 
37 
 
As for previous cost variables, SC estimates are accurate also for the purchase of living goods 
and services, as depicted in Figure 11. Unfortunately there is no policy effect since 
differences between the two lines are too small after 2006 to conclude that there is a 
substantial reduction in terms of cost.  
In Figure 12 we find results for cost for combustibles, carburant and lubricants. The series of 
pre-policy intervention for LHA of Pisa is too discontinuous to find a good fit of the SC 
estimate. Considering that the fit of the model is weak, we although find some effect after 
policy introduction.  
IT cost variable (Figure 13), beneath the small impact on total cost, clearly show an important 
reduction of expenses after policy implementation, i.e. the pre-policy trajectory is very close 
to the real one and post-policy values are lower than estimate of null effect.  
As for IT purchase, also maintenance costs are well expressed as a linear combination of non-
treated LHAs in the years before 2006, as in Figure 14. Given that differences between real 
and projected outcomes are not close to zero, it is clear that the policy had an effect for this 
specific balance item after 2006. The effect is diminishing in the last couple of years but still 
clear.  
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Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
  
Pisa 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Veterinary 
 
Food 
 
Living 
 
Combustibles 
 
IT 
 
Maintenance 
 Acute admissions  
 
19.35 
 
18.69 
 
18.24 
 
17.99 
 
18.03 
 
18.76 
 
17.55 
 
17.90 
 Rehabilitation admissions 
 
15.18 
 
14.98 
 
13.67 
 
13.38 
 
14.06 
 
14.23 
 
12.17 
 
12.87 
 Long-care term admissions 
 
11.07 
 
13.34 
 
11.03 
 
9.36 
 
10.53 
 
11.53 
 
10.24 
 
11.34 
 Acute total days 
 
21.20 
 
20.49 
 
19.95 
 
19.83 
 
19.84 
 
20.46 
 
19.44 
 
19.74 
 Long-care total days 
 
14.77 
 
17.63 
 
14.81 
 
11.96 
 
14.02 
 
15.22 
 
13.41 
 
14.45 
 Rehabilitation total days 
 
18.36 
 
18.12 
 
16.83 
 
16.39 
 
17.24 
 
17.32 
 
14.61 
 
15.26 
 Prop. over 80 y.o. 
 
5.62 
 
5.88 
 
4.65 
 
5.27 
 
5.44 
 
3.80 
 
5.03 
 
4.64 
 Prop. over 65 y.o. 
 
22.08 
 
22.50 
 
19.27 
 
21.46 
 
21.47 
 
17.43 
 
20.34 
 
19.07 
 Prop. under 14 y.o. 
 
11.56 
 
11.74 
 
15.22 
 
12.86 
 
12.16 
 
15.80 
 
12.67 
 
14.22 
 Share of non-working people 
 
27.06 
 
22.59 
 
33.12 
 
27.56 
 
25.17 
 
36.88 
 
24.48 
 
24.89 
 Average stay 
 
7.48 
 
6.79 
 
6.38 
 
7.49 
 
7.25 
 
6.54 
 
7.89 
 
7.40 
 Performance Index 
 
0.98 
 
0.95 
 
0.94 
 
1.04 
 
1.00 
 
0.96 
 
1.04 
 
1.02 
 Case mix control 
 
1.10 
 
1.03 
 
0.97 
 
1.02 
 
1.06 
 
0.97 
 
1.05 
 
1.00 
 Share of complications 
 
32.13 
 
30.80 
 
29.52 
 
31.35 
 
30.57 
 
27.44 
 
31.93 
 
33.28 
 GDP per capita 
 
13211.69 
 
15436.17 
 
11211.26 
 
12208.72 
 
13330.36 
 
9953.40 
 
13446.78 
 
13168.40 
 Residents  /Municipalities 
 
9.39 
 
9.08 
 
9.60 
 
8.36 
 
8.92 
 
9.37 
 
8.30 
 
8.00 
 Population density 
 
5.27 
 
4.96 
 
5.52 
 
4.82 
 
5.30 
 
5.48 
 
4.70 
 
4.19 
 Medical wages p.c.  
 
13.04 
 
13.10 
 
12.97 
 
13.06 
 
12.98 
 
12.88 
 
12.94 
 
13.04 
 Professional sector wages p.c.  
 
8.03 
 
7.94 
 
7.37 
 
7.27 
 
7.61 
 
7.56 
 
7.06 
 
7.45 
 Technical sector wages p.c.  
 
11.16 
 
11.29 
 
11.30 
 
11.32 
 
11.20 
 
11.02 
 
11.21 
 
11.39 
 Administrative sector wages p.c.  
 
10.57 
 
10.79 
 
10.74 
 
10.70 
 
10.62 
 
10.53 
 
10.63 
 
10.78 
 Table 3: averages 1997-2005 for LHA of Pisa for covariates in the first column; weighted averages with SC weights for each model in the following columns.  
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Figure 8: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Pharmaceuticals. LHA of Pisa.  
Figure 9: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Veterinary goods. LHA of Pisa.  
Figure 10: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Food goods and services. LHA of Pisa.  
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Figure 13: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Living goods and serivces. LHA of Pisa.  
Figure 12: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Combustibles, carburant, lubricants. LHA of Pisa.  
Figure 13: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: IT services and goods. LHA of Pisa. 
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Figure 14: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and 
real outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Maintenance goods and services. LHA of Pisa. 
 
5.5 Synthetic Control: Siena  
In this section we report results obtained with SC procedure for the LHA of Siena. Table 4 
reports predictor balance of covariates. As described in Section 5.1, in the first column we 
calculate averages of covariates for LHA of Siena over 1997-2005. In the remaining ones we 
report the average outcomes weighted with SC weights in the same 1997-2005 interval for 
the units included in each donor pool with assigned weights. The pre-treatment goodness of 
fit is on average quite good for each variable and good balance between covariates and real 
averages in the interval 1997-2005 reveals that SC procedure is a good choice to provide 
correct estimates. As for LHA of Florence and LHA of Pisa, balance predictor for covariates 
for LHA of Siena (Table 18) reveals that on average covariates are well weighted in 
estimation procedures for all models. 
First of all we analyse the item regarding pharmaceuticals, which result is in Figure 15. We 
have to keep in mind that pharmaceuticals are the most heavy balance driver, results in 
pharmaceuticals are similar to the one obtained for total expenses, i.e. a dump in 2011, an 
overall goodness of fit and null policy effect.  
As it is clear from right-hand panel of Figure 16, differences between real values and 
estimates obtained through SC procedure before 2006 are close to zero for veterinary per-
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capita expenses. These differences do not have a clear trend after 2006 and this can mean that 
policy is meaningless in terms of savings for this specific item.  
We can deduce the same conclusions also for foodstuff goods and services (Figure 17) but 
also for purchases of living goods and services (Figure 18) since differences between real 
values and estimates of per-capita expenses are toward zero.  
As in previous cases the model which estimate per-capita expenditure for combustibles, 
carburant and lubricants has a good pre-policy fit (Figure 19) and show an effective impact of 
the policy after 2006. More precisely, in right-hand panel of Figure 19 we observe small and 
random differences between estimates and real values in pre-policy period together with big 
and almost surely non-random differences after policy implementation.  
The per-capita cost for IT goods and services (Figure 20) along with per-capita cost for 
maintenance (Figure 21) is somehow well predicted by SC procedure. In other words, for 
both items, pre-policy series of per-capita expenditures show a good fit, and essentially 
conceal any effect of the introduction of ESTAV in balances, either in terms of savings or 
losses. Moreover, concerning these two last items, SC procedure deals with the same 
unexpected gap in year 2001 we observe for other cost variables.  
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Table 4: averages 1997-2005 for LHA of Siena for covariates in the first column; weighted averages with SC weights for each model in the following columns.  
 
    
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
  
Siena 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Veterinary 
 
Food 
 
Living 
 
Combustibles 
 
IT 
 
Maintenance 
 Acute admissions  
 
18.86 
 
18.09 
 
17.95 
 
18.31 
 
18.84 
 
17.54 
 
17.96 
 
17.45 
 Rehabilitation admissions 
 
14.69 
 
13.79 
 
13.25 
 
14.12 
 
14.08 
 
13.80 
 
14.07 
 
13.88 
 Long-care term admissions 
 
10.58 
 
11.47 
 
9.48 
 
11.35 
 
12.69 
 
11.00 
 
10.58 
 
9.73 
 Acute total days 
 
20.71 
 
19.92 
 
19.67 
 
20.04 
 
20.57 
 
19.35 
 
19.73 
 
19.24 
 Long-care total days 
 
14.28 
 
15.69 
 
12.51 
 
15.52 
 
17.12 
 
15.13 
 
14.09 
 
12.84 
 Rehabilitation total days 
 
17.87 
 
17.20 
 
16.40 
 
17.40 
 
17.40 
 
16.97 
 
17.19 
 
17.03 
 Prop. over 80 y.o. 
 
6.09 
 
5.84 
 
4.48 
 
4.02 
 
4.60 
 
5.19 
 
4.91 
 
5.78 
 Prop. over 65 y.o. 
 
23.59 
 
22.15 
 
19.06 
 
17.50 
 
18.95 
 
20.88 
 
20.03 
 
22.76 
 Prop. under 14 y.o. 
 
11.49 
 
11.72 
 
15.32 
 
15.66 
 
14.11 
 
12.96 
 
13.02 
 
11.57 
 Share of non-working people 
 
23.59 
 
25.01 
 
33.90 
 
36.26 
 
30.60 
 
26.83 
 
26.16 
 
26.62 
 Average stay 
 
7.48 
 
7.65 
 
6.61 
 
6.54 
 
6.57 
 
7.21 
 
7.07 
 
7.48 
 Performance Index 
 
0.98 
 
1.04 
 
0.95 
 
0.97 
 
0.97 
 
1.01 
 
1.00 
 
1.02 
 Case mix control 
 
1.10 
 
1.05 
 
0.99 
 
0.97 
 
0.99 
 
1.04 
 
1.01 
 
1.06 
 Share of complications 
 
32.13 
 
30.21 
 
30.32 
 
26.55 
 
28.37 
 
29.85 
 
28.96 
 
30.04 
 GDP per capita 
 
13312.35 
 
12726.98 
 
10475.45 
 
10440.89 
 
12574.06 
 
12757.70 
 
12515.30 
 
12536.79 
 Residents  /Municipalities 
 
8.96 
 
7.97 
 
9.20 
 
9.02 
 
9.33 
 
8.84 
 
8.85 
 
8.08 
 Population density 
 
4.22 
 
4.60 
 
5.11 
 
5.80 
 
5.49 
 
5.15 
 
4.93 
 
4.60 
 Medical wages p.c.  
 
13.05 
 
13.07 
 
12.81 
 
12.87 
 
12.98 
 
13.02 
 
12.83 
 
12.98 
 Professional sector wages p.c.  
 
8.12 
 
7.27 
 
6.92 
 
7.02 
 
7.65 
 
7.13 
 
7.38 
 
7.06 
 Technical sector wages p.c.  
 
11.23 
 
11.30 
 
11.13 
 
11.15 
 
11.27 
 
11.34 
 
11.09 
 
11.02 
 Administrative sector wages p.c.  
 
10.74 
 
10.80 
 
10.55 
 
10.50 
 
10.66 
 
10.77 
 
10.55 
 
10.71 
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Figure 15: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Pharmaceuticals. LHA of Siena. 
Figure 16: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Veterinary goods. LHA of Siena. 
Figure 17: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Food goods and services. LHA of Siena. 
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Figure 18: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Living goods and serivces. LHA of Siena. 
Figure 19: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Combustibles, carburant, lubricants. LHA of Siena. 
Figure 20: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: IT services and goods. LHA of Siena. 
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Figure 24: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right). Cost variable considered: Maintenance goods and services. LHA of Siena. 
 
5.6 Synthetic Control for Tuscany  
Our final analysis focuses on the whole Region Tuscany and compares it with all other Italian 
Regions. Recall that in Tuscany exist three different and independent ESTAVs, which 
institutional centres are located in Florence, Pisa and Siena. As before, in Table 5 we report 
covariates balance.  
We already described in sections 5.3-5.5 the results of SC analysis conducted using as 
observational unit each single Tuscany L.H.A. (namely Florence, Pisa and Siena) and in this 
section we want to focus and measure the impact of the creation of ESTAVs in terms of 
savings within the Regional system, providing estimates of Tuscany as a weighted linear 
combination of all other regions. Results are discussed above.  
If we consider projected outcomes of Synthetic Control estimates for pharmaceuticals (Figure 
22), these are underestimates of real per capita costs in post ESTAV creation period, and 
show null differences in pre-policy implementation. The effect found for pharmaceuticals is 
exactly opposite to the one observed for other per capita expenditure items, i.e. all other items 
show significant reductions in terms of per-capita expenditure. The only exception are per-
capita expenditures devoted to maintenance services and materials (Figure 28), where 
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beneath a good pre-policy fitting the post-policy implementation period show small and 
random discrepancies between real and estimated cost outcomes.  
In detail, veterinary per capita expenditures are overall decreasing in real terms for Tuscany 
(Figure 23) and before 2006 the goodness of fit of Synthetic Control is quite good. In 
addition it seems that the Synthetic Control weighted average of per capita expenditures for 
veterinary purposes is decreasing too but with a lower rate, meaning that SC procedure 
cannot entirely capture the effect in terms of saving which has been caused by policy 
implementation.  
In addition, both for food goods and services and for living expenditures we observe an 
overall increase in the post-policy implementation period for the Synthetic Control trajectory 
despite a good pre 2006 fitting, as in Figure 24 and in Figure 25. Real Tuscany per-capita 
expenditures are instead on average constant for foodstuff goods and services (after 2005, 
blue line in left-hand panel of Figure 23) or present a small increase for living goods and 
expenditures (blue line in left-hand panel of Figure 25). In both cases differences between 
Synthetic and Real trajectories are increasing, revealing an almost sure policy savings effect.  
Moreover, per capita expenditures for comestibles, carburant and lubricants and per capita 
expenditures for IT services and goods are constant over the time span considered after the 
policy implementation (2006-2013, red lines in left-hand part of Figure 26 and Figure 27) if 
we consider the synthetic Tuscany average calculated as a linear combination of Italian 
Regions. Real values (blue lines in left-hand part of Figure 26 and Figure 27) are by the way 
significantly decreasing, we find negative – and even increasing in absolute values – 
differences between real and Synthetic lines, as in right-hand panel of Figures 26 and 27.  
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Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
Outcome: 
 
  
Tuscany 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
Veterinary 
 
Food 
 
Living 
 
Combustibles 
 
IT 
 
Maintenance 
 Acute admissions  
 
5.28 
 
5.39 
 
5.38 
 
5.29 
 
5.39 
 
5.29 
 
5.28 
 
5.32 
 Rehabilitation admissions 
 
1.11 
 
1.48 
 
1.60 
 
0.77 
 
1.05 
 
1.27 
 
-0.45 
 
1.68 
 Long-care term admissions 
 
-2.99 
 
0.55 
 
-2.64 
 
-2.76 
 
-4.37 
 
-1.44 
 
-2.10 
 
-2.18 
 Acute total days 
 
7.13 
 
7.21 
 
7.16 
 
7.13 
 
7.23 
 
7.12 
 
7.14 
 
7.11 
 Long-care total days 
 
0.70 
 
5.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.17 
 
-2.29 
 
2.06 
 
0.71 
 
0.68 
 Rehabilitation total days 
 
4.29 
 
4.71 
 
4.63 
 
3.99 
 
4.20 
 
4.27 
 
1.78 
 
4.61 
 Prop. over 80 y.o. 
 
5.74 
 
5.79 
 
4.62 
 
5.26 
 
5.50 
 
5.06 
 
4.39 
 
5.13 
 Prop. over 65 y.o. 
 
22.29 
 
22.21 
 
18.95 
 
20.85 
 
21.64 
 
20.60 
 
18.40 
 
20.59 
 Prop. under 14 y.o. 
 
11.66 
 
11.52 
 
14.64 
 
12.95 
 
12.64 
 
12.52 
 
14.07 
 
12.95 
 Share of non-working people 
 
25.27 
 
21.10 
 
22.64 
 
25.99 
 
23.91 
 
25.23 
 
25.70 
 
24.34 
 Average stay 
 
7.48 
 
6.90 
 
6.78 
 
7.17 
 
7.46 
 
7.53 
 
7.58 
 
7.06 
 Performance Index 
 
0.98 
 
0.94 
 
0.97 
 
1.00 
 
1.02 
 
1.02 
 
1.02 
 
0.98 
 Case mix control 
 
1.10 
 
1.07 
 
0.97 
 
1.03 
 
1.04 
 
1.05 
 
1.01 
 
1.02 
 Share of complications 
 
32.13 
 
31.79 
 
28.43 
 
31.54 
 
32.55 
 
30.02 
 
30.49 
 
30.55 
 GDP per capita 
 
13755.07 
 
15368.52 
 
14045.10 
 
12498.74 
 
13818.58 
 
13732.89 
 
13631.27 
 
13532.76 
 Residents  /Municipalities 
 
9.44 
 
9.39 
 
8.60 
 
8.56 
 
8.62 
 
8.67 
 
8.50 
 
8.65 
 Population density 
 
5.03 
 
5.18 
 
4.37 
 
4.82 
 
5.04 
 
5.01 
 
4.67 
 
4.72 
 Medical wages p.c.  
 
13.05 
 
13.05 
 
13.15 
 
13.00 
 
13.05 
 
12.99 
 
13.05 
 
13.02 
 Professional sector wages p.c.  
 
8.02 
 
7.95 
 
7.75 
 
7.38 
 
7.56 
 
7.49 
 
7.53 
 
7.57 
 Technical sector wages p.c.  
 
11.23 
 
11.14 
 
11.39 
 
11.24 
 
11.38 
 
11.15 
 
11.32 
 
11.20 
 Administrative sector wages p.c.  
 
10.68 
 
10.69 
 
10.92 
 
10.56 
 
10.70 
 
10.73 
 
10.85 
 
10.70 
 Table 5: averages 1997-2005 for Tuscany for covariates in the first column; weighted averages with SC weights for each model in the following columns.  
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Figure 22: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: Pharmaceuticals. 
Figure 23: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: Veterinary goods.  
Figure 24: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: Food goods and services. 
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Figure 25: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: Living goods and services.  
Figure 26: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: Combustibles, carburant, lubricants.  
Figure 27: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: IT services and goods. 
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Figure 28: Real and projected trajectories (left) and difference between synthetic control estimate and real 
outcome (right) in Tuscany. Cost variable considered: Maintenance goods and services. 
 
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis  
For each LHA of interest (Florence, Pisa and Siena) we run 92 SC procedures randomly 
assigning the treatment (i.e. policy introduction) to each unit included in the donor pool. We 
compute for each model the Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE). As described in 
Section 4 we therefore estimate through SC procedure for each balance item a policy effect as 
the single unit had experienced the same policy implementation. We calculate the proportion 
of effects     which exceed the effect    where the i-th unit of observation is represented by 
LHA of Florence, LHA of Pisa, LHA of Siena for LHA donor pool, and Region Tuscany for 
Regional set up.  
Left-hand part of Tables 6, 8 and 10 report for each item and for each relevant LHA the 
number of effect potentially caused by the random assignment of treatment in 2005 which are 
above the estimated effect for LHA of Florence (Table 6), Pisa (Table 8) and Siena (Table 
10). In these cases the number of LHA that have been considered as treated unit is 92 for 
each LHA in Tuscany. In right-hand part of the above mentioned Tables we calculate the 
proportion of effects that are smaller than the estimated SC effect for LHA of Florence, Pisa 
and Siena respectively. We can interpret this proportion as the probability of finding an effect 
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which is lower than the observed effect for the LHA of interest, i.e. the likelihood of finding 
an effect which has greater extent in terms of saving.  We can thus interpret this proportion as 
a p-value in classical inference framework.  
Tables 7, 9 and 11 respectively report for each item and for each LHA in Tuscany the number 
of effect potentially caused by the random assignment of treatment in 2005 which are above 
the estimated effect for LHA of Florence, Pisa and Siena. In these Tables we exclude from 
the donor pool all estimates which present a RMSPE at least 1.5 times higher the RMSPE of 
the real treated unit.  
We also compute the proportion of meaningful differences excluding from dataset all models 
with RMSPE ratio higher than two, three and ten. Estimates are robust over this change even 
if the number of models that remain in the specification dramatically decrease.  
For what concerns LHA of Florence from Tables 6 and 7 we observe that the saving effect 
regarding per-capita expenditures for the sum of all goods and services from 2007 is on 
average in the highest decile for both the whole LHA sample and for the sample with 
restrictions. LHA of Florence presents robust savings in particular for combustibles, 
carburant and lubricants. From Tables 8 and 9 we can conclude that per capita expenditures 
for veterinary medicine and for maintenance goods and services for LHA of Pisa are robust to 
random assignment of the policy. Lastly we analyse LHA of Siena, where with the only 
exception of per capita expenditures for combustibles and for IT services and goods in the 
first two year after policy implementation we do not find any effect in the first decile of the 
distribution, i.e. we do not find any effect which reveals us strength results.  
We also compute effect randomisation considered Tuscany as a single unit, as in section 5.4. 
We have two possible specifications, one is the case in which only regions are in the donor 
pool while in the second one Tuscany is a weighted average of LHAs and in the donor pool 
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we produce estimates for only local health authorities. For both these specifications we 
randomly assign treatment each time to a different unit or region and we estimate Synthetic 
Control model. We find that the two specifications are very similar and produce similar 
results. Unfortunately estimates are weak in inference framework, since in the donor pool we 
only have twenty regions and the possible exclusion of any single region due to RMSPE ratio 
higher than 1.5 give back a donor pool in which the minimum value assumed by proportion 
of higher effect is 
 
  
      , which is higher. We conduct the same analysis also for 
average treatment effect as in Cavallo et al. (2013). 
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Florence 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Proportion 
outcome                                         2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food 78 92 79 92 71 92 73 92 64 92 70 92 61 92 54 92 0.152 0.141 0.228 0.207 0.304 0.239 0.337 0.413 
Combustibles 28 92 89 92 87 92 87 92 86 92 79 92 71 92 69 92 0.696 0.033 0.054 0.054 0.065 0.141 0.228 0.250 
Pharmaceuticals 47 92 25 92 24 92 13 92 22 92 27 92 32 92 29 92 0.489 0.728 0.739 0.859 0.761 0.707 0.652 0.685 
Living 47 92 59 92 53 92 45 92 49 92 49 92 44 92 45 92 0.489 0.359 0.424 0.511 0.467 0.467 0.522 0.511 
IT 60 92 65 92 61 92 66 92 70 92 73 92 75 92 83 92 0.348 0.293 0.337 0.283 0.239 0.207 0.185 0.098 
Maintenance 38 92 55 92 74 92 50 92 65 92 61 92 69 92 69 92 0.587 0.402 0.196 0.457 0.293 0.337 0.250 0.250 
Veterinary 74 92 85 92 77 92 67 92 80 92 70 92 65 92 70 92 0.196 0.076 0.163 0.272 0.130 0.239 0.293 0.239 
Table 6: for each balance item and for each year in post-policy period are reported the total number of LHA in the donor pool ( ) and the number of LHA which estimated 
SC effect is above estimated effect for Florence (   . In right-hand side of the Table for each year and for each balance item, we find the proportion of effects which are 
under the estimated effect, i.e. the opposite of the ratio between   and   . 
Florence 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Proportion 
outcome                                         2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food 41 43 40 43 35 43 37 43 33 43 36 43 31 43 26 43 0.047 0.070 0.186 0.140 0.233 0.163 0.279 0.395 
Combustibles 0 19 17 19 16 19 16 19 15 19 13 19 11 19 11 19 1.000 0.105 0.158 0.158 0.211 0.316 0.421 0.421 
Pharmaceuticals 30 62 12 62 12 62 2 62 9 62 13 62 17 62 15 62 0.516 0.806 0.806 0.968 0.855 0.790 0.726 0.758 
Living 10 16 11 16 10 16 7 16 8 16 7 16 5 16 5 16 0.375 0.313 0.375 0.563 0.500 0.563 0.688 0.688 
IT 12 16 10 16 9 16 11 16 12 16 12 16 13 16 14 16 0.250 0.375 0.438 0.313 0.250 0.250 0.188 0.125 
Maintenance 13 40 24 40 33 40 26 40 31 40 30 40 31 40 31 40 0.675 0.400 0.175 0.350 0.225 0.250 0.225 0.225 
Veterinary 45 53 50 53 45 53 39 53 47 53 39 53 35 53 41 53 0.151 0.057 0.151 0.264 0.113 0.264 0.340 0.226 
Table 7: for each balance item and for each year in post-policy period are reported the total number of LHA in the donor pool ( ) which RMSPE is less than 1.5 higher the 
RMSPE of Florence and the number of LHA which estimated SC effect is above estimated effect for Florence (    and which RMSPE is less than 1.5 higher the RMSPE of 
Florence. In right-hand side of the Table for each year and for each balance item, we find the proportion of effects which are under the estimated effect, i.e. the opposite of 
the ratio between   and   . 
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Pisa 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Proportion 
outcome                                         2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food 67 92 57 92 63 92 54 92 50 92 50 92 54 92 64 92 0.272 0.380 0.315 0.413 0.457 0.457 0.413 0.304 
Combustibles 67 92 87 92 82 92 81 92 70 92 75 92 75 92 56 92 0.272 0.054 0.109 0.120 0.239 0.185 0.185 0.391 
Pharmaceuticals 23 92 41 92 28 92 14 92 21 92 34 92 45 92 45 92 0.750 0.554 0.696 0.848 0.772 0.630 0.511 0.511 
Living 50 92 61 92 72 92 62 92 51 92 47 92 40 92 39 92 0.457 0.337 0.217 0.326 0.446 0.489 0.565 0.576 
IT 74 92 73 92 65 92 61 92 66 92 70 92 69 92 84 92 0.196 0.207 0.293 0.337 0.283 0.239 0.250 0.087 
Maintenance 62 92 84 92 88 92 79 92 70 92 75 92 73 92 71 92 0.326 0.087 0.043 0.141 0.239 0.185 0.207 0.228 
Veterinary 84 92 71 92 89 92 85 92 87 92 90 92 87 92 88 92 0.087 0.228 0.033 0.076 0.054 0.022 0.054 0.043 
Table 8: for each balance item and for each year in post-policy period are reported the total number of LHA in the donor pool ( ) and the number of LHA which estimated 
SC effect is above estimated effect for Pisa (   . In right-hand side of the Table for each year and for each balance item, we find the proportion of effects which are under the 
estimated effect, i.e. the opposite of the ratio between   and   . 
Pisa 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Proportion 
outcome                                         2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food 26 31 20 31 21 31 19 31 18 31 18 31 20 31 24 31 0.161 0.355 0.323 0.387 0.419 0.419 0.355 0.226 
Combustibles 61 77 73 77 68 77 67 77 58 77 63 77 64 77 48 77 0.208 0.052 0.117 0.130 0.247 0.182 0.169 0.377 
Pharmaceuticals 3 51 22 51 12 51 3 51 6 51 18 51 23 51 24 51 0.941 0.569 0.765 0.941 0.882 0.647 0.549 0.529 
Living 9 14 10 14 13 14 10 14 8 14 5 14 3 14 3 14 0.357 0.286 0.071 0.286 0.429 0.643 0.786 0.786 
IT 42 47 39 47 33 47 32 47 33 47 37 47 37 47 44 47 0.106 0.170 0.298 0.319 0.298 0.213 0.213 0.064 
Maintenance 14 18 17 18 17 18 17 18 16 18 16 18 14 18 15 18 0.222 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.111 0.111 0.222 0.167 
Veterinary 67 73 57 73 70 73 69 73 70 73 71 73 71 73 70 73 0.082 0.219 0.041 0.055 0.041 0.027 0.027 0.041 
Table 9: for each balance item and for each year in post-policy period are reported the total number of LHA in the donor pool ( ) which RMSPE is less than 1.5 higher the 
RMSPE of Pisa and the number of LHA which estimated SC effect is above estimated effect for Pisa (    and which RMSPE is less than 1.5 higher the RMSPE of Pisa. In 
right-hand side of the Table for each year and for each balance item, we find the proportion of effects which are under the estimated effect, i.e. the opposite of the ratio 
between   and   . 
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Siena 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Proportion 
outcome                                         2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food 60 92 49 92 51 92 46 92 39 92 46 92 45 92 38 92 0.348 0.467 0.446 0.500 0.576 0.500 0.511 0.587 
Combustibles 78 92 73 92 76 92 76 92 77 92 71 92 61 92 57 92 0.152 0.207 0.174 0.174 0.163 0.228 0.337 0.380 
Pharmaceuticals 10 92 42 92 35 92 50 92 55 92 47 92 53 92 55 92 0.891 0.543 0.620 0.457 0.402 0.489 0.424 0.402 
Living 21 92 38 92 38 92 46 92 48 92 53 92 50 92 49 92 0.772 0.587 0.587 0.500 0.478 0.424 0.457 0.467 
IT 86 92 83 92 51 92 28 92 40 92 25 92 53 92 56 92 0.065 0.098 0.446 0.696 0.565 0.728 0.424 0.391 
Maintenance 40 92 42 92 67 92 59 92 43 92 40 92 47 92 62 92 0.565 0.543 0.272 0.359 0.533 0.565 0.489 0.326 
Veterinary 73 92 56 92 55 92 33 92 59 92 22 92 54 92 33 92 0.207 0.391 0.402 0.641 0.359 0.761 0.413 0.641 
Table 10: for each balance item and for each year in post-policy period are reported the total number of LHA in the donor pool ( ) and the number of LHA which estimated 
SC effect is above estimated effect for Siena (   . In right-hand side of the Table for each year and for each balance item, we find the proportion of effects which are under 
the estimated effect, i.e. the opposite of the ratio between   and   . 
Siena 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Proportion 
outcome                                         2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Food 22 31 15 31 17 31 16 31 15 31 16 31 17 31 13 31 0.290 0.516 0.452 0.484 0.516 0.484 0.452 0.581 
Combustibles 71 77 64 77 63 77 63 77 65 77 59 77 51 77 49 77 0.078 0.169 0.182 0.182 0.156 0.234 0.338 0.364 
Pharmaceuticals 0 51 23 51 16 51 27 51 32 51 25 51 27 51 29 51 1.000 0.549 0.686 0.471 0.373 0.510 0.471 0.431 
Living 0 14 5 14 6 14 6 14 6 14 8 14 5 14 5 14 1.000 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.643 0.643 
IT 46 47 45 47 26 47 13 47 22 47 12 47 28 47 28 47 0.021 0.043 0.447 0.723 0.532 0.745 0.404 0.404 
Maintenance 6 18 7 18 13 18 12 18 10 18 9 18 10 18 12 18 0.667 0.611 0.278 0.333 0.444 0.500 0.444 0.333 
Veterinary 59 73 42 73 44 73 22 73 48 73 17 73 41 73 22 73 0.192 0.425 0.397 0.699 0.342 0.767 0.438 0.699 
Table 11: for each balance item and for each year in post-policy period are reported the total number of LHA in the donor pool ( ) which RMSPE is less than 1.5 higher the 
RMSPE of Siena and the number of LHA which estimated SC effect is above estimated effect for Siena (    and which RMSPE is less than 1.5 higher the RMSPE of Siena. 
In right-hand side of the Table for each year and for each balance item, we find the proportion of effects which are under the estimated effect, i.e. the opposite of the ratio 
between   and   . 
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6 Conclusions and Policy Implication 
 
Governments, regions and Ministry of Health have introduced in the past 15 years measures 
to keep public health expenditure under control, which is likely to imply a reduction in the 
authorities and an increase in scale effect and corruption contrast. Tuscany opened the route 
to the creation of ESTAVs and purchase centralisation. 
Following our previous analysis we calculate differences from real and synthetic values of 
expenditures and we interpret these differences as the impact of the introduction of 
centralised authorities responsible for the purchases of goods and supplying of services 
within each LHA. In addition, since the above mentioned are the differences between what is 
really happened to public expenditures and what would have happened to the same balance 
items in absence of the policy introduction, we in turn expect negative values.  
The overall effect of the policy for the LHA of Florence (Table 12) is an increase by 272 
million Euros in the eight years considered (2006-2013) and this is mostly driven by 
pharmaceuticals (+355 million Euros). The huge increase in pharmaceuticals vanishes some 
important savings the policy has obtained, such as 25 million Euros from food and food 
services, about 21 million Euros from combustibles, more than 15 million Euros from IT 
services and goods and 26 million Euros from maintenance goods and services. If we do not 
consider pharmaceuticals (last row of Table 12) the policy avoided LHA to spend about 84 
million Euros in eight years, on average more than 10 millions for each year.  
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  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Food -2305 -3695 -3679 -3877 -3041 -3814 -2672 -2029 -25112 
Combustibles 401 -2553 -4332 -4535 -4315 -2504 -1426 -1323 -20586 
Pharmaceuticals 6658 26121 25716 77197 61155 59858 45722 53353 355779 
Living -269 -1471 -554 1557 589 866 2047 1298 4064 
IT -520 -787 -1163 -1622 -1790 -2795 -2847 -3904 -15427 
Maintenance 1159 -1550 -4544 -239 -4941 -2572 -8815 -4863 -26365 
Veterinary -32 -24 -18 -8 -20 -12 -7 -9 -132 
Florence 5092 16041 11426 68473 47637 49027 32002 42523 272221 
Excluding 
Pharmaceuticals -1566 -10081 -14290 -8723 -13518 -10830 -13720 -10830 -83558 
Table 12: Differences in thousands of Euro between real and Synthetic Control Estimates for years 2006-2013. 
LHA of Florence.  
For what concerns LHA of Pisa (Table 13), the overall increase in terms of expenditures is 
reduced compared to Florence even if expenditures by item are proportional between the two 
LHAs. Also in this case (as for LHA of Florence) the only item that shows an increase in 
overall expenditure after policy introduction is pharmaceuticals. In fact whether we consider 
pharmaceuticals in the overall calculus of policy effect we obtained savings for 107 million 
Euros or losses for 102 million Euros. Once again pharmaceuticals represent the overall 
driving force with an increase higher than 209 million of Euros on a total increase of 102 
million of Euros. Other items have taken advantage from the policy, as for maintenance 66 
million Euros have been saved, 12 million Euros for food goods and services and 10 million 
Euros for combustibles. 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Food -1180 -1645 -2645 -1521 -861 -744 -1168 -2668 -12431 
Combustibles -189 -1314 -1502 -1798 -1160 -1865 -1963 -657 -10448 
Pharmaceuticals 15665 7598 18889 63017 52476 33424 5872 12563 209503 
Living -488 -1867 -4487 -2019 242 940 3247 2347 -2085 
IT -1025 -1207 -1552 -1367 -1491 -2467 -2164 -4296 -15568 
Maintenance -1568 -8903 -10408 -10184 -7556 -10145 -11010 -6444 -66218 
Veterinary -71 -27 -101 -71 -110 -92 -53 -51 -576 
Pisa 11144 -7365 -1807 46057 41541 19051 -7239 794 102177 
Excluding 
Pharmaceuticals -4521 -14963 -20696 -16959 -10935 -14372 -13111 -11769 -107327 
Table 13: Differences in thousands of Euro between real and Synthetic Control Estimates for years 2006-2013. 
LHA of Pisa.  
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Also LHA of Siena has increased its expenditures in pharmaceuticals even at a smaller extent 
(+23 million Euros). This is likely due to the fact that LHA of Siena has on average half of 
the inhabitant with respect to Florence and Pisa and as a consequence its total savings are 
reduced. As in previous cases the overall effect (+22 million Euros) is mostly driven by 
pharmaceuticals, whilst other variables have effects closer to zero. The sum of remaining 
items but pharmaceuticals shows savings for about 1 million euros in the eight years 
considered. 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Food -601 -463 -514 73 461 40 -42 -8 -1056 
Combustibles -206 -437 -849 -940 -1289 -925 -884 -649 -6180 
Pharmaceuticals 23423 4222 8573 327 -6031 6480 -6153 -8054 22787 
Living 2371 1339 745 777 630 39 -465 -381 5056 
IT -904 -868 -264 609 112 923 -353 -924 -1670 
Maintenance 641 398 -1642 -2067 1724 3438 1317 -865 2946 
Veterinary -48 -7 -3 17 -27 29 -1 6 -34 
Siena 24677 4184 6046 -1203 -4422 10023 -6582 -10875 21848 
Excluding 
Pharmaceuticals 1253 -39 -2527 -1530 1610 3543 -429 -2821 -939 
Table 14: Differences in thousands of Euro between real and Synthetic Control Estimates for years 2006-2013. 
LHA of Siena.  
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Food -1543 -7561 -6756 -5931 -4251 -6568 -8028 -8989 -49628 
Combustibles -801 -5116 -7418 -6503 -5945 -6336 -6820 -7273 -46212 
Pharmaceuticals 112320 122059 199508 245289 230625 240190 154083 148605 1452679 
Living -3382 -9453 -15715 -12860 -11712 -9717 -8797 -9858 -81495 
IT -5129 -7079 -5104 -4036 -4407 -6665 -6887 -6182 -45490 
Maintenance 3034 -7187 -16487 -12376 -2864 -5001 -11069 -1278 -53227 
Veterinary -53 -23 -55 -206 -245 -191 -253 -60 -1085 
Tuscany 104447 85640 147973 203376 201201 205712 112229 114966 1175543 
Excluding 
Pharmaceuticals -7873 -36419 -51535 -41913 -29424 -34478 -41854 -33640 -277136 
Table 15: Differences in thousands of Euro between real and Synthetic Control Estimates for years 2006-2013. 
Region Tuscany.  
 
In Table 15 we report results for whole Tuscany and we compare the real overall 
expenditures with respect to other Regions. Our conclusions are exactly in line with previous 
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cases: Tuscany faced an increase in expenditures equal to 1 billion and 176 million Euros, 
pharmaceuticals experienced an increase which was quite close to 1 billion and a half, 
enabling us to conclude that without considering pharmaceuticals (last row of Table 15) 
Tuscany would have obtained savings for about 270 million Euros. This last results and all 
balance item results are in line with the sum of savings obtained by the three independent 
LHAs even if the magnitude of differences is bigger, revealing that Italian Regions are less 
efficient than their LHAs.  
The unification of formers LHAs into AV, and the introduction of ESTAVs in Tuscany have 
carried with it a substantial and clear reduction in expenditures for goods and services, except 
for pharmaceuticals. In fact they exhibit a negative and unexpected reaction to the policy. The 
overall result is likely to be determined by this specific item, which account for high 
frequency of total expenditures for goods and services. We are not aware about policy 
changes that could have caused explosion in pharmaceutical items e.g. increase in 
reimbursement towards hospitals, undertake of new diseases, prevention campaigns. 
Nevertheless some specific items as combustibles, food goods and living services show a 
positive and robust reaction to the policy, maybe due to economies of scale effects, 
confirming the goodness of the idea of the creation of specific centres for purchases. We find 
the most powerful results in terms of goodness-of-fit and differences between real and 
synthetic outcome trajectories for combustibles, carburant, lubricants, but also for IT and 
stationary materials.  
From an economic point of view is very difficult to think that living goods and services or IT 
goods can be considered as substitutes of pharmaceutical goods and we use this intuition to 
strengthen our results. Indeed positive effects of the policy in terms of savings can have 
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carried the decision for Tuscany to use that money to invest in pharmaceuticals to increase 
quality of care. Future analysis would be appropriate to disentangle this relation.  
One major limitation of this study is the fact that the time series is too short, nevertheless we 
are aware that this first contribution can be extended through the use of administrative data to 
produce more accurate estimates across LHAs. Another possible extension of the present 
work could consider intra-regional mobility of patients, considering incoming and exiting 
flows of patients to Tuscany and from Tuscany. This covariate would be meaningful to refine 
the standardisation by population dimension, even if we already include in our analysis 
volumes controls.  
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Appendix A1. 
List of Local Health Authorities by Region. 
Regional Local Health Authorities (5): Valle D’Aosta, Autonomous Province of Trento, 
Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Marche, Molise.  
Provincial Local Health Authorities (87): Abruzzo (4): LHAs of  ’Aquila, Chieti, Pescara 
and Teramo; Basilicata (2): LHAs of Potenza and Matera; Calabria (5): LHAs of Catanzaro, 
Crotone, Cosenza, Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia; Campania (5): LHAs of Avellino, 
Benevento, Caserta, Napoli, Salerno; Emilia Romagna (9): LHAs of Bologna (province of 
Bologna and province of Imola), Ferrara, Forlì-Cesena, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, 
Reggio Emilia, Rimini; Friuli Venezia Giulia (4): LHAs of Gorizia, Pordenone, Trieste, 
Udine; Lazio (5): LHAs of Frosinone, Latina, Rieti, Roma, Viterbo; Liguria (4): LHAs of 
Genova, Imperia, Savona, La Spezia; Lombardia (11): LHAs of Bergamo, Brescia, Como, 
Cremona, Lecco, Lodi, Mantova, Milano (province of Milano and province of Monza), Pavia, 
Sondrio, Varese; Piemonte (8): LHAs of Alessandria, Asti, Biella, Cuneo, Novara, Torino, 
Verbania, Vercelli; Puglia (5): LHAs of Bari (province of Bari and province of Barletta), 
Brindisi, Foggia, Lecce, Taranto; Sardegna (4): LHAs of Cagliari (provinces of Cagliari, 
Carbonia-Iglesias, Medio-Campidano), Nuoro (provinces of Nuoro and Ogliastra), Oristano, 
Sassari (provinces of Olbia and Sassari); Sicilia (9); LHAs of Agrigento, Caltanissetta, 
Catania, Enna, Messina, Palermo, Ragusa, Siracusa, Trapani; Tuscany: LHAs of Florence 
(provicnes of Prato, Pistoia, Florence, Empoli), Pisa (provinces of Massa Carrara, Livorno, 
Lucca, Pisa), Siena ( provinces of Grosseto, Siena, Arezzo); Umbria (2): LHAs of Perugia 
and Terni; Veneto (7): LHAs of Belluno, Padova, Rovigo, Treviso, Venezia, Verona, 
Vicenza.  
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Appendix A2, Descriptive statistics, covariates. 
Table A2.1: Average population. 
Table A2.1a: Average population for Italian Local Health Authorities. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 
n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
618442 645863 
 
619100 645354 
 
625004 650652 
 
633844 660370 
 
643317 670981 
 
647171 680366 
Florence 1 
 
1427888 612 
 
1429527 1807 
 
1447038 11496 
 
1472334 8184 
 
1497979 6925 
 
1514134 12668 
Pisa 1 
 
1283241 2197 
 
1280561 361 
 
1288724 6704 
 
1305609 8752 
 
1329018 4877 
 
1334889 3152 
Siena 1 
 
781432 684 
 
784799 1430 
 
796414 7062 
 
811179 6501 
 
828895 2061 
 
831282 1892 
Note: Average population of units of observation in three-year intervals for Italian and for Tuscany LHAs. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, 
with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. 
Table A2.1b: Average population for Italian Local Health Authorities. 
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 
n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 21 
 
2709363 2279692 
 
2712250 2290114 
 
2738114 2321683 
 
2776839 2367810 
 
2818340 2412452 
 
2835225 2450194 
Tuscany 1  3492560 2118  3494887 3595  3532176 25227  3589122 23314  3655892 13836  3680304 17712 
Note: Regional average population in three-year intervals for Italian Regions and for Tuscany. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only 
exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years.   
67 
 
Tables A2.2: Population composition and Demographical indicators. 
Table A2.2a: Population composition for Italian Local Health Authorities. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Prop. over 80 y.o. 92 
 
4.4 1.1 
 
4.5 1.1 
 
5.1 1.1 
 
5.6 1.2 
 
6.1 1.1 
 
6.6 1.1 
Prop. over 65 y.o. 92 
 
18.5 3.2 
 
19.3 3.1 
 
20.1 3.0 
 
20.8 2.9 
 
21.1 2.8 
 
21.6 2.6 
Prop. under 14 y.o. 92 
 
14.1 2.9 
 
13.9 2.5 
 
13.8 2.1 
 
13.7 1.7 
 
13.7 1.5 
 
13.6 1.3 
Population density 92 
 
5.2 0.8 
 
5.1 0.8 
 
5.1 0.8 
 
5.1 0.8 
 
5.2 0.8 
 
5.2 0.8 
Resid./Municipalities 92  8.8 0.8  8.8 0.8  8.8 0.8  8.8 0.8  8.8 0.8  8.8 0.8 
Note: Demographical indicators in three-year intervals for population in Italian Local Health Authorities. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, 
with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Population density and the ratio between number of residents and 
number of municipalities are expressed in log terms. 
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Table A2.2b: Population composition for Local Health Authority of Florence. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Prop. over 80 y.o. 1 
 
5.3 0.2 
 
5.4 0.3 
 
6.2 0.2 
 
6.7 0.2 
 
7.2 0.1 
 
7.5 0.1 
Prop. over 65 y.o. 1 
 
21.1 0.2 
 
21.8 0.2 
 
22.4 0.2 
 
23.1 0.1 
 
23.2 0.0 
 
23.7 0.2 
Prop. under 14 y.o. 1 
 
11.5 0.1 
 
11.8 0.1 
 
12.3 0.1 
 
12.7 0.2 
 
13.2 0.1 
 
13.3 0.1 
Population density 1 
 
5.7 0.0 
 
5.7 0.0 
 
5.7 0.0 
 
5.7 0.0 
 
5.7 0.0 
 
5.7 0.0 
Resid./Municipalities 1  9.9 0.0  9.9 0.0  9.9 0.0  9.9 0.0  10.0 0.0  10.0 0.0 
Note: Demographical indicators in three-year intervals for population in Local Health Authority of Florence. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, 
with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Population density and the ratio between number of residents and 
number of municipalities are expressed in log terms. 
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Table A2.2c: Population composition for Local Health Authority of Pisa. 
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Prop. over 80 y.o. 1 
 
5.3 0.2 
 
5.4 0.3 
 
6.2 0.2 
 
6.7 0.1 
 
7.1 0.2 
 
7.4 0.0 
Prop. over 65 y.o. 1 
 
21.4 0.2 
 
22.0 0.2 
 
22.8 0.3 
 
23.5 0.1 
 
23.6 0.1 
 
24.2 0.2 
Prop. under 14 y.o. 1 
 
11.4 0.0 
 
11.5 0.1 
 
11.7 0.1 
 
12.0 0.1 
 
12.3 0.1 
 
12.5 0.0 
Population density 1 
 
5.3 0.0 
 
5.3 0.0 
 
5.3 0.0 
 
5.3 0.0 
 
5.3 0.0 
 
5.3 0.0 
Resid./Municipalities 1  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0 
Note: Demographical indicators in three-year intervals for population in Local Health Authority of Pisa. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, 
with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Population density and the ratio between number of residents and 
number of municipalities are expressed in log terms. 
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Table A2.2d: Population composition for Local Health Authority of Pisa. 
   
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Prop. over 80 y.o. 1 
 
5.7 0.2 
 
5.9 0.3 
 
6.7 0.2 
 
7.3 0.2 
 
7.7 0.2 
 
8.0 0.0 
Prop. over 65 y.o. 1 
 
23.1 0.2 
 
23.6 0.2 
 
24.0 0.1 
 
24.3 0.1 
 
24.0 0.0 
 
24.4 0.2 
Prop. under 14 y.o. 1 
 
11.3 0.0 
 
11.5 0.1 
 
11.7 0.1 
 
12.0 0.1 
 
12.4 0.1 
 
12.6 0.0 
Population density 1 
 
4.2 0.0 
 
4.2 0.0 
 
4.2 0.0 
 
4.3 0.0 
 
4.3 0.0 
 
4.3 0.0 
Resid./Municipalities 1  9.0 0.0  9.0 0.0  9.0 0.0  9.0 0.0  9.0 0.0  9.0 0.0 
Note: Demographical indicators in three-year intervals for population in Local Health Authority of Siena. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, 
with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Population density and the ratio between number of residents and 
number of municipalities are expressed in log terms. 
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Table A2.2e: Population composition for Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Prop. over 80 y.o. 21 
 
4.3 1.0 
 
4.4 1.0 
 
5.0 1.0 
 
5.6 1.1 
 
6.1 1.1 
 
6.5 1.0 
Prop. over 65 y.o. 21 
 
18.2 2.9 
 
19.1 2.9 
 
19.8 2.8 
 
20.6 2.7 
 
20.9 2.5 
 
21.5 2.4 
Prop. under 14 y.o. 21 
 
14.3 2.7 
 
14.1 2.3 
 
14.0 1.9 
 
13.9 1.6 
 
13.8 1.4 
 
13.7 1.2 
Population density 21 
 
4.9 0.6 
 
4.9 0.6 
 
4.9 0.6 
 
5.0 0.6 
 
5.0 0.6 
 
5.0 0.7 
Resid./Municipalities 21  8.7 0.6  8.7 0.6  8.7 0.6  8.7 0.6  8.7 0.6  8.7 0.6 
Note: Regional demographical indicators in three-year intervals for population in Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces. Variables are averaged over the 
3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Population density and the ratio between number 
of residents and number of municipalities are expressed in log terms. 
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Table A2.2f: Population composition for Tuscany. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Prop. over 80 y.o. 1 
 
5.4 0.2 
 
5.5 0.3 
 
6.3 0.2 
 
6.9 0.2 
 
7.3 0.1 
 
7.6 0.0 
Prop. over 65 y.o. 1 
 
21.7 0.2 
 
22.3 0.2 
 
22.9 0.2 
 
23.5 0.1 
 
23.6 0.0 
 
24.0 0.2 
Prop. under 14 y.o. 1 
 
11.4 0.0 
 
11.6 0.1 
 
11.9 0.1 
 
12.3 0.1 
 
12.7 0.1 
 
12.9 0.0 
Population density 1 
 
5.0 0.0 
 
5.0 0.0 
 
5.0 0.0 
 
5.1 0.0 
 
5.1 0.0 
 
5.1 0.0 
Resid./Municipalities 1  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0  9.4 0.0  9.5 0.0  9.5 0.0  9.5 0.0 
Note: Regional demographical indicators in three-year intervals for population of Tuscany. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only 
exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Population density and the ratio between number of residents and number of 
municipalities are expressed in log terms. 
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Tables A2.3: Wages. 
Table A2.3a: Standardised wages for employees in public health providers in Italian Local Health Authorities. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Medical wages p.c.  92 
 
323.61 69.2 
 
432.51 100.2 
 
478.83 97.1 
 
500.84 101.2 
 
496.50 105.9 
 
461.94 114.1 
Professional sector wages p.c.  92 
 
1.23 0.7 
 
1.86 0.9 
 
2.16 1.0 
 
2.36 1.2 
 
2.34 1.0 
 
2.13 1.0 
Technical sector wages p.c.  92 
 
63.53 17.0 
 
72.77 21.8 
 
74.85 22.5 
 
73.33 24.0 
 
71.72 25.7 
 
65.51 25.8 
Administrative sector wages p.c.  92  34.13 7.9  42.04 12.0  48.19 12.4  49.85 12.6  48.63 12.4  44.18 12.5 
Notes: Wages for four different categories of employees working in public health providers within LHA public structures standardised by population 
dimension for Italian LHAs. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only 
two years.  
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Table A2.3b: Standardised wages for employees in public health providers in Local Health Authority of Florence. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Medical wages p.c.  1 
 
364.37 5.3 
 
493.13 74.6 
 
543.62 14.0 
 
570.48 6.8 
 
558.33 16.6 
 
514.69 17.1 
Professional sector wages p.c.  1 
 
1.72 0.1 
 
2.87 0.5 
 
3.75 0.4 
 
3.94 0.1 
 
3.68 0.1 
 
3.41 0.2 
Technical sector wages p.c.  1 
 
70.07 0.6 
 
85.40 10.9 
 
79.93 1.7 
 
77.32 1.8 
 
80.87 5.7 
 
80.76 2.9 
Administrative sector wages p.c.  1  36.34 0.4  47.37 6.5  53.31 1.5  54.21 1.4  48.99 2.3  44.70 2.2 
Notes: Wages for four different categories of employees working in public health providers within LHA of Florence standardised by population dimension. 
Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years.  
Table A2.3c: Standardised wages for employees in public health providers in Local Health Authority of Pisa. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Medical wages p.c.  1 
 
364.31 4.4 
 
495.80 75.7 
 
552.45 14.0 
 
560.56 10.9 
 
567.14 8.0 
 
517.52 21.2 
Professional sector wages p.c.  1 
 
2.33 0.1 
 
3.31 0.7 
 
3.85 0.1 
 
4.28 0.2 
 
3.95 0.2 
 
3.45 0.1 
Technical sector wages p.c.  1 
 
64.24 0.9 
 
75.95 11.1 
 
72.78 4.1 
 
72.49 2.5 
 
77.51 2.4 
 
69.86 2.2 
Administrative sector wages p.c.  1  31.54 0.8  40.27 6.4  46.60 2.6  48.28 1.3  44.61 1.5  39.75 1.4 
Notes: Wages for four different categories of employees working in public health providers within LHA of Pisa standardised by population dimension. 
Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years.  
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Table A2.3d: Standardised wages for employees in public health providers in Local Health Authority of Siena. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Medical wages p.c.  1 
 
385.68 5.8 
 
472.36 70.7 
 
562.01 14.1 
 
589.05 6.7 
 
578.48 7.4 
 
534.99 16.2 
Professional sector wages p.c.  1 
 
2.69 0.1 
 
3.47 0.6 
 
4.11 0.1 
 
4.31 0.1 
 
3.69 0.2 
 
3.41 0.1 
Technical sector wages p.c.  1 
 
73.69 4.1 
 
72.50 9.3 
 
79.54 0.9 
 
80.28 1.3 
 
78.15 2.2 
 
73.35 2.6 
Administrative sector wages p.c.  1  40.17 0.6  46.00 5.1  53.69 1.1  53.89 1.8  48.70 2.3  43.09 1.3 
Notes: Wages for four different categories of employees working in public health providers within LHA of Siena standardised by population dimension. 
Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years.  
Table A2.3e: Standardised wages for employees in public health providers in Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Medical wages p.c.  21 
 
339.5 58 
 
456.4 88.6 
 
512.5 77.9 
 
543.9 84.8 
 
541.9 97.2 
 
505.5 107 
Professional sector wages p.c.  21 
 
1.26 0.53 
 
1.949 0.77 
 
2.261 0.77 
 
2.536 0.89 
 
2.433 0.83 
 
2.244 0.85 
Technical sector wages p.c.  21 
 
68.12 11.6 
 
78.84 19.9 
 
81.91 20.9 
 
81.57 23.7 
 
79.47 25.3 
 
73.11 26.9 
Administrative sector wages p.c.  21  36.02 8.66  45 14.1  52.21 13.9  53.72 14.4  52.13 14.9  47.3 16 
Notes: Wages for four different categories of employees working in Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces public health providers standardised by 
population dimension. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two 
years.  
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Table A2.3f: Standardised wages for employees in public health providers in Tuscany. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Variable n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Medical wages p.c.  1 
 
373.4 3.71 
 
492.2 67.7 
 
551.9 13.9 
 
572 6.07 
 
570.1 10.2 
 
520.3 18.4 
Professional sector wages p.c.  1 
 
2.298 0.14 
 
3.239 0.46 
 
3.866 0.14 
 
4.155 0.06 
 
3.78 0.11 
 
3.422 0.14 
Technical sector wages p.c.  1 
 
69.15 1.03 
 
79.39 9.01 
 
77.37 2.11 
 
76.37 0.94 
 
79.51 0.97 
 
75.14 2.53 
Administrative sector wages p.c.  1  36.35 0.15  44.89 5.33  51.12 1.83  52.21 1.12  48.29 1.94  42.54 1.68 
Notes: Wages for four different categories of employees working in Tuscany public health providers standardised by population dimension. Variables are 
averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years.  
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Tables A2.4: Per capita Gross domestic product (GDP). 
Table A2.4a: Standardised Gross domestic product (GDP) Italian Local Health Authority Territories. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 
n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
9994.8 2749.7 
 
11311.5 2867.3 
 
12564.0 3056.2 
 
12869.5 2989.5 
 
13004.4 3069.8 
Florence 1 
 
12685.7 481.3 
 
13883.7 267.1 
 
15197.6 296.6 
 
15386.4 223.2 
 
15645.0 92.0 
Pisa 1 
 
11092.7 555.0 
 
12544.7 371.8 
 
14025.2 327.2 
 
14346.9 104.4 
 
14467.6 110.7 
Siena 1  11285.9 583.9  12706.0 347.0  14091.8 306.1  14394.5 150.7  14469.3 95.5 
Notes: Gross domestic product (gdp) per capita. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval 
comprehends only two years. Unit of observation is each single LHA. 
Table A2.4b: Standardised Gross domestic product (GDP) Italian Local Health Authority Territories. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 
n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 21 
 
10253.4 2585.3 
 
11623.6 2733.8 
 
12914.0 2906.6 
 
13289.5 2912.8 
 
13426.6 3010.9 
Tuscany 1  11787.7 531.2  13129.6 323.8  14521.2 309.5  14783.6 162.5  14952.4 101.3 
Notes: Gross domestic product (gdp) per capita. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval 
comprehends only two years. Unit of observation is each single Region. 
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Tables A2.5: Share of non-working people. 
Table A2.5a: Share of non-working people in Italian Local Health Authority Territories. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 
n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 92 
 
30.9 8.9 
 
28.9 8.2 
 
28.7 7.7 
 
30.0 7.1 
 
31.4 7.0 
Florence 1 
 
24.2 1.1 
 
23.3 0.9 
 
24.0 0.6 
 
25.6 0.2 
 
26.6 0.7 
Pisa 1 
 
27.6 1.1 
 
26.3 0.4 
 
25.8 0.8 
 
27.3 0.4 
 
29.0 0.5 
Siena 1  23.8 1.0  22.6 0.5  22.2 0.9  24.2 0.3  25.8 0.6 
Notes: Share of non-working people. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval 
comprehends only two years. Unit of observation is each single LHA. 
Table A2.5b: Share of non-working people in Italian Regions and Autonomous Provinces. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 
n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 21 
 
30.2 8.7 
 
28.2 8.0 
 
27.9 7.5 
 
29.2 7.1 
 
30.5 7.1 
Florence 1  25.4 1.1  24.2 0.6  24.2 0.7  25.9 0.3  27.3 0.6 
Notes: Share of non-working people. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval 
comprehends only two years. Unit of observation is each single Region.  
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Tables A2.6: Utilisation rates, i.e. volumes of treatment performed standardised by population dimension. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
Italy  n   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Acute adm. 21 
 
206.6 32.7 
 
211.0 23.4 
 
206.5 31.3 
 
196.5 26.8 
 
175.9 
20.1 
 
157.3 17.6 
Rehabilitation adm. 
21 
 
3.9 3.8 
 
4.4 3.7 
 
5.1 
3.9 
 
5.4 3.7 
 
5.4 3.0 
 
5.6 2.7 
Long-care term adm. 21 
 
1.2 2.2 
 
0.9 1.8 
 
1.7 2.0 
 
1.8 2.0 
 
1.9 1.8 
 
2.1 1.9 
Acute total days 21 
 
1340.1 240.1 
 
1259.5 158.8 
 
1161.0 159.7 
 
1096.8 136.1 
 
1001.2 113.3 
 
908.4 104.5 
Long-care total days 21 
 
35.1 53.1 
 
43.0 60.5 
 
50.7 62.0 
 
56.4 61.3 
 
56.5 57.0 
 
55.0 53.7 
Rehabilitation total days 21 
 
86.2 73.4 
 
98.7 74.7 
 
116.0 80.4 
 
126.7 84.0 
 
131.8 72.5 
 
132.9 60.4 
Average stay 21   7.2 0.8   7.0 0.9   6.9 
0.8 
  6.9 0.8   6.9 0.7   6.9 0.6 
Tuscany 
                   
Acute adm. 1 
 
201.0 4.7 
 
201.4 0.9 
 
186.8 3.8 
 
177.2 2.8 
 
167.4 4.9 
 
153.8 4.2 
Rehabilitation adm. 1 
 
3.0 0.5 
 
2.7 0.1 
 
3.5 0.3 
 
3.6 0.3 
 
3.6 0.1 
 
3.3 
0.3 
Long-care term adm. 1 
 
0.2 0.4 
 
0.4 0.4 
 
0.7 0.1 
 
0.7 
0.0 
 
0.8 0.1 
 
0.9 0.2 
Acute total days 1 
 
1347.6 21.4 
 
1270.2 
31.8 
 
1139.4 28.8 
 
1038.9 30.9 
 
948.2 34.0 
 
854.3 28.5 
Long-care total days 
1 
 
9.5 16.4 
 
28.2 
0.4 
 
22.2 3.3 
 
22.2 1.3 
 
23.4 2.5 
 
24.5 1.6 
Rehabilitation total days 1 
 
85.5 15.8 
 
63.8 1.5 
 
73.2 4.3 
 
72.2 4.0 
 
73.1 2.1 
 
68.4 3.3 
Average stay 1 
  
7.5 0.2   7.4 0.1   7.5 0.1   7.3 0.1   6.5 0.1   6.4 0.0 
Notes: Utilisation rates for Tuscany and average of Italian Regions. Variables are divided by population dimension, multiplied by one thousand and then 
averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Unit of observation is each 
single Region.  
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Tables A2.7: Quality and performance indicators. 
 
  
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
 
Years: 
   
1997-1999 
 
2000-2002 
 
2003-2005 
 
2006-2008 
 
2009-2011 
 
2012-2013 
 n  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Italy 
                   Performance Index 21 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
Case mix control 21 
 
0.7 0.5 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.1 
 
1.0 0.0 
Share of post-intervention  
complications 21   15.8 11.6   25.9 3.4   29.4 4.1   31.4 4.3   33.2 4.3   34.2 4.1 
Tuscany 
                   Performance Index 1 
 
1.0 0.0 
 
1.0 0.0 
 
1.0 0.0 
 
1.0 0.0 
 
0.9 0.0 
 
0.9 0.0 
Case mix control 1 
 
0.7 0.6 
 
1.1 0.0 
 
1.1 0.0 
 
1.1 0.0 
 
1.1 0.0 
 
1.1 0.0 
Share of post-intervention  
complications 1   16.3 14.1   26.9 0.7   32.7 2.5   34.4 0.1   35.5 1.1   38.4 0.3 
Notes: Quality indicators for Tuscany and average of Italian Regions. Variables are averaged over the 3-year-intervals, with the only exception of the last 
period, where the interval comprehends only two years. Unit of observation is each single Region. 
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Appendix A3, Real and Synthetic Control estimates.  
Table A3.1: Local Health Authority of Florence. 
 
LHA: Florence LHA: Florence LHA: Florence LHA: Florence LHA: Florence LHA: Florence LHA: Florence 
 
Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: 
 
Pharmaceuticals Veterinary Food Living Combustibles IT Maintenance 
Year Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. 
1997 11.87 11.88 3.33 3.29 9.13 9.13 10.03 10.02 8.86 8.85 8.78 8.76 10.23 10.27 
1998 11.92 11.95 3.65 3.66 9.09 9.09 10.02 10.01 8.74 8.73 8.82 8.80 10.22 10.26 
1999 12.03 11.99 3.97 3.78 9.23 9.23 10.03 10.06 8.78 8.77 8.73 8.71 10.19 10.23 
2000 12.14 12.09 3.45 3.59 9.29 9.29 10.23 10.23 8.61 8.60 8.73 8.72 10.31 10.35 
2001 12.22 12.18 2.93 3.19 9.37 9.37 10.32 10.32 8.55 8.54 8.54 8.52 10.32 10.36 
2002 12.30 12.30 3.24 3.67 9.38 9.39 10.46 10.44 8.53 8.52 8.56 8.54 10.28 10.32 
2003 12.43 12.44 3.04 3.26 9.47 9.47 10.54 10.54 8.41 8.40 8.60 8.56 10.21 10.25 
2004 12.52 12.50 3.08 3.35 9.48 9.48 10.54 10.50 8.23 8.22 8.36 8.37 10.32 10.36 
2005 12.61 12.54 3.57 3.43 9.44 9.44 10.50 10.51 8.32 8.31 8.50 8.47 10.29 10.33 
2006 12.57 12.56 3.22 3.85 9.43 9.55 10.49 10.50 8.32 8.25 8.51 8.58 10.36 10.34 
2007 12.64 12.58 2.50 3.36 9.30 9.51 10.49 10.52 7.57 8.21 8.43 8.54 10.37 10.40 
2008 12.64 12.59 2.28 3.09 9.40 9.58 10.53 10.54 6.93 8.28 8.45 8.60 10.36 10.45 
2009 12.71 12.54 2.50 2.85 9.41 9.61 10.56 10.53 6.62 8.24 8.37 8.60 10.45 10.45 
2010 12.70 12.57 2.30 3.16 9.47 9.61 10.54 10.53 6.62 8.20 8.37 8.61 10.40 10.50 
2011 12.70 12.57 2.35 2.93 9.43 9.62 10.57 10.55 6.71 7.82 8.20 8.61 10.41 10.46 
2012 12.66 12.55 2.12 2.58 9.43 9.57 10.52 10.49 6.82 7.53 8.11 8.56 10.41 10.57 
2013 12.64 12.52 2.08 2.63 9.41 9.52 10.44 10.41 6.71 7.43 7.93 8.58 10.36 10.46 
RMSPE 
 
0.033 
 
0.225 
 
<0.001 
 
0.016 
 
<0.001 
 
0.013 
 
<0.001 
Note: Real and Synthetic Control estimates. In the last row Root Mean Square Prediction Error. LHA of Florence. 
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Table A3.2: Local Health Authority of Pisa. 
 
LHA:  
Pisa 
LHA:  
Pisa 
LHA:  
Pisa 
LHA:  
Pisa 
LHA:  
Pisa 
LHA:  
Pisa 
LHA:  
Pisa 
 
Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: 
 
Pharmaceuticals Veterinary Food Living Combustibles IT Maintenance 
Year Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. 
1997 11.85 11.87 7.54 6.35 9.57 9.59 9.99 10.00 7.11 7.40 8.46 8.51 10.17 10.18 
1998 11.90 11.93 4.78 5.15 9.53 9.54 10.12 10.13 8.04 7.77 8.40 8.38 10.21 10.22 
1999 12.01 11.99 4.55 4.95 9.54 9.56 10.05 10.07 7.20 7.39 8.78 8.78 10.18 10.19 
2000 12.11 12.08 4.18 4.43 9.64 9.66 10.12 10.14 7.51 7.34 8.96 8.92 10.28 10.29 
2001 12.20 12.16 4.06 4.21 9.68 9.70 10.22 10.23 7.42 7.39 9.16 9.13 10.41 10.41 
2002 12.30 12.29 4.03 4.29 9.72 9.74 10.26 10.28 7.23 7.28 9.16 9.14 10.40 10.42 
2003 12.36 12.39 4.16 3.85 9.76 9.78 10.35 10.37 7.35 7.49 8.98 8.92 10.35 10.37 
2004 12.46 12.45 3.93 4.14 9.73 9.75 10.39 10.41 7.52 7.41 8.77 8.77 10.51 10.51 
2005 12.50 12.49 4.13 4.43 9.72 9.73 10.39 10.41 7.82 7.79 8.59 8.68 10.49 10.50 
2006 12.56 12.52 3.55 4.50 9.66 9.72 10.41 10.42 7.70 7.77 8.57 8.71 10.44 10.48 
2007 12.56 12.54 3.68 4.10 9.62 9.70 10.42 10.46 7.19 7.75 8.55 8.72 10.38 10.57 
2008 12.60 12.55 3.26 4.64 9.58 9.71 10.41 10.51 7.18 7.80 8.58 8.78 10.36 10.58 
2009 12.66 12.50 3.13 4.34 9.62 9.69 10.47 10.51 6.94 7.78 8.56 8.74 10.46 10.66 
2010 12.67 12.53 3.08 4.65 9.65 9.69 10.53 10.52 7.01 7.59 8.50 8.70 10.57 10.71 
2011 12.64 12.56 2.10 4.35 9.62 9.66 10.56 10.54 6.89 7.78 8.29 8.67 10.54 10.72 
2012 12.57 12.55 2.16 3.88 9.55 9.61 10.57 10.50 7.09 7.89 8.31 8.64 10.55 10.75 
2013 12.56 12.52 2.28 3.88 9.42 9.57 10.49 10.44 6.87 7.29 7.97 8.72 10.53 10.65 
RMSPE 
 
0.022 
 
0.485 
 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
 
0.170 
 
0.045 
 
0.008 
Note: Real and Synthetic Control estimates. In the last row Root Mean Square Prediction Error. LHA of Pisa. 
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Table A3.3: Local Health Authority of Siena. 
 
LHA: Siena LHA: Siena LHA: Siena LHA: Siena LHA: Siena LHA: Siena LHA: Siena 
 
Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: 
 
Pharmaceuticals Veterinary Food Living Combustibles IT Maintenance 
Year Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. 
1997 11.76 11.76 4.98 4.99 9.62 9.60 9.90 9.91 8.97 9.00 8.28 8.21 10.20 10.16 
1998 11.85 11.82 3.85 3.86 9.47 9.48 9.94 9.93 8.86 8.80 8.27 8.20 10.16 10.17 
1999 11.91 11.87 4.17 4.17 9.55 9.53 10.00 10.01 8.78 8.81 8.32 8.25 10.19 10.16 
2000 11.98 11.94 4.07 4.09 9.59 9.58 10.14 10.14 8.67 8.62 8.39 8.32 10.19 10.15 
2001 11.75 11.95 4.20 4.20 9.45 9.45 10.03 10.10 8.37 8.47 8.26 8.19 9.78 9.96 
2002 12.23 12.11 3.81 3.83 9.67 9.66 10.26 10.25 8.78 8.63 8.47 8.40 10.28 10.22 
2003 12.30 12.27 4.09 4.10 9.65 9.64 10.35 10.37 8.30 8.24 8.38 8.31 10.31 10.28 
2004 12.38 12.36 4.15 4.18 9.66 9.64 10.50 10.48 7.49 7.56 8.18 8.10 10.34 10.35 
2005 12.48 12.41 4.85 4.84 9.66 9.65 10.54 10.53 7.59 7.59 8.35 8.27 10.45 10.37 
2006 12.49 12.37 4.28 4.88 9.62 9.67 10.60 10.52 7.42 7.57 8.04 8.35 10.47 10.45 
2007 12.53 12.51 4.49 4.59 9.60 9.64 10.60 10.56 7.27 7.59 8.02 8.32 10.48 10.47 
2008 12.58 12.54 4.46 4.51 9.61 9.66 10.60 10.57 7.33 7.85 8.23 8.32 10.47 10.53 
2009 12.59 12.59 4.43 4.15 9.64 9.63 10.60 10.57 7.11 7.77 8.44 8.26 10.48 10.55 
2010 12.60 12.62 4.41 4.74 9.69 9.65 10.59 10.57 7.23 7.99 8.34 8.31 10.49 10.43 
2011 12.63 12.60 4.46 3.94 9.67 9.66 10.60 10.59 7.33 7.88 8.38 8.09 10.49 10.37 
2012 12.54 12.56 3.28 3.34 9.62 9.62 10.57 10.59 7.40 7.90 8.00 8.13 10.55 10.50 
2013 12.52 12.55 3.51 3.26 9.56 9.56 10.53 10.55 7.30 7.72 8.22 8.49 10.53 10.56 
RMSPE 
 
0.085 
 
0.011 
 
0.010 
 
0.025 
 
0.071 
 
<0.001 
 
0.072 
Note: Real and Synthetic Control estimates. In the last row Root Mean Square Prediction Error. LHA of Siena 
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Table A3.4: Tuscany. 
 
Tuscany Tuscany Tuscany Tuscany Tuscany Tuscany Tuscany 
 
Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: Outcome: 
 
Pharmaceuticals Veterinary Food Living Combustibles IT Maintenance 
Year Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. Tr. Sy. 
1997 11.84 11.89 6.60 5.68 9.43 9.41 9.99 10.02 8.54 8.62 8.57 8.62 10.21 10.16 
1998 11.90 11.97 4.24 4.66 9.36 9.38 10.05 10.07 8.57 8.53 8.57 8.52 10.22 10.20 
1999 12.00 12.03 4.25 4.29 9.43 9.43 10.03 10.06 8.43 8.41 8.67 8.73 10.20 10.20 
2000 12.10 12.06 3.90 4.20 9.50 9.51 10.17 10.16 8.35 8.31 8.76 8.72 10.29 10.27 
2001 12.12 12.15 3.77 4.45 9.51 9.52 10.22 10.27 8.21 8.23 8.77 8.77 10.26 10.24 
2002 12.29 12.23 3.71 4.24 9.58 9.57 10.35 10.34 8.30 8.12 8.81 8.76 10.33 10.29 
2003 12.38 12.33 3.80 3.95 9.63 9.62 10.43 10.43 8.11 8.11 8.73 8.65 10.29 10.28 
2004 12.47 12.38 3.72 4.14 9.62 9.59 10.48 10.44 7.87 7.94 8.50 8.58 10.40 10.37 
2005 12.54 12.41 4.18 3.71 9.60 9.60 10.47 10.51 8.02 8.01 8.52 8.60 10.41 10.38 
2006 12.55 12.43 3.66 3.98 9.56 9.59 10.49 10.52 7.96 8.04 8.44 8.71 10.42 10.39 
2007 12.59 12.46 3.66 3.82 9.50 9.64 10.49 10.57 7.38 8.02 8.40 8.77 10.40 10.46 
2008 12.63 12.43 3.48 3.87 9.53 9.66 10.51 10.62 7.13 8.10 8.47 8.73 10.40 10.53 
2009 12.68 12.45 3.46 4.48 9.56 9.67 10.55 10.63 6.87 7.92 8.48 8.69 10.48 10.57 
2010 12.68 12.47 3.40 4.57 9.60 9.68 10.56 10.64 6.93 7.88 8.43 8.66 10.51 10.53 
2011 12.68 12.45 3.33 4.38 9.57 9.69 10.58 10.65 6.95 7.93 8.29 8.67 10.50 10.54 
2012 12.60 12.44 2.49 4.39 9.52 9.67 10.55 10.61 7.07 8.02 8.16 8.59 10.49 10.57 
2013 12.58 12.43 2.63 3.40 9.45 9.63 10.48 10.55 6.93 8.00 8.02 8.46 10.46 10.47 
RMSPE 
 
0.068 
 
0.505 
 
0.015 
 
0.025 
 
0.072 
 
0.060 
 
0.014 
Note: Real and Synthetic Control estimates for Tuscany. In the last row Root Mean Square Prediction Error.  
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Abstract 
Waiting times are a major policy concern in publicly-funded health systems across OECD 
countries. Economists have argued that, in the presence of excess demand, waiting times act 
as non-monetary prices to bring demand for and supply of health care in equilibrium. Using 
administrative data disaggregated by region and surgical procedure over 2010-2014 in Italy, 
we estimate demand and supply elasticities with respect to waiting times. We employ linear 
regression models with first-differences and instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity 
of waiting times. We find that demand is inelastic to waiting times while supply is more 
elastic. Estimates of demand elasticity are between -0.15 to -0.24. Our results have 
implications on the effectiveness of policies aimed at increasing supply and their ability to 
reduce waiting times.  
Keywords: Waiting times; Elective surgery; Demand; Supply. 
JEL: I10 
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1. Introduction 
Waiting times in health care sector are a major health policy concern across many OECD 
countries (Siciliani, Borowitz and Moran, 2013). Waiting times for elective surgeries can last 
several months (Siciliani, Moran and Borowitz, 2014) and generate dissatisfaction to patients 
and the general public. Patients’ disutility from waiting includes postponed health benefits, 
potential worsening of health status while waiting, and uncertainty about receipt of treatment. 
In many publicly funded systems, the combination of capacity constraints and limited or no 
user charges generates an excess demand. Patients are added to a waiting list and are asked to 
wait. Economists have argued that in the absence of price rationing, waiting times act as a 
form of non-price rationing which brings together the demand for and the supply of health 
care (see seminal papers by Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984, and Martin and Smith, 1999). 
On the demand side, a longer wait will induce some patients to go private at a fee (or a 
reduced fee if they hold private health insurance) or to seek a less intensive drug treatment, 
therefore reducing the demand for public surgery. On the supply side, waiting times may 
induce hospitals to work harder and provide more treatments if doctors are altruistic (i.e. they 
feel bad about the patients waiting excessively) or if penalties are in place for hospitals 
exceeding maximum waiting time guarantees (see Martin and Smith, 1999, for a theoretical 
model, and Propper et al, 2008, on penalties).  
From a policy perspective, it is critical to establish the extent to which demand and supply 
respond to waiting time. For example, if demand is highly elastic, an exogenous increase in 
supply will only have minimal effect in reducing waiting times. In turn, this will make 
policymakers more reluctant to fund additional resources. Similarly, if supply is elastic, an 
exogenous increase in demand (e.g. due to ageing population or technology) will imply that 
waiting time will increase only to a small extent.  
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There is extensive empirical evidence on demand and supply elasticities from the United 
Kingdom. Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) and Martin and Smith (1999) find that the 
elasticity of demand is generally low. The finding is also confirmed by more recent studies 
(Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton, 2002; Gravelle, Smith and Xavier, 2003, and Martin, Jacobs, 
Rice and Smith, 2007). In most studies, demand elasticity is below -0.2. Estimates of supply 
elasticity are less stable and vary depending on methods, sample and time period considered 
(see Siciliani and Iversen, 2012 for a more detailed discussion of the literature). 
We know however very little about demand and supply elasticities from other OECD 
countries. These are likely to differ based on differ institutional arrangements (gatekeeping 
system, use of user charges, payment arrangements) and funding levels. Administrative data 
on waiting times have been collected within the English NHS since its inception, but only in 
the last years in other countries (Siciliani, Moran and Borowitz, 2014).  
We advance the literature by filling this gap in knowledge, and study demand and supply 
elasticities within the Italian context. Using administrative data in 2010-2014, we employ 
linear regression models exploiting variability in waiting times by region, surgical procedure 
and time. We first estimated pooled cross-section models using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Second, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to deal with the endogeneity of 
waiting time due to simultaneity of demand and supply. Finally, we use a first-difference 
estimation procedure to address the remaining endogeneity of waiting time due to its possible 
correlation with time-invariant unobserved factors (e.g. regional factors). Differently from 
fixed-effect modes, which require strict exogeneity (i.e. the error term is uncorrelated to past, 
present as well as future values of the control variables), first-difference models only require 
a weak-exogeneity assumption (i.e. there is no feedback from the idiosyncratic shock today to 
a covariate tomorrow). This is a considerably weaker assumption as it permits future values 
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of the regressors to be correlated with the error, which is particularly important for the use of 
past values of regressors as controls or as instruments. 
Our key finding is that demand is inelastic to waiting times and in the range of -0.15 and -
0.24. This result is important for policy. It implies that an increase in publicly-funded supply 
will reduce waiting times to a great extent since reductions in waiting are only offset by a 
small increase in demand. Conversely, governments under financial pressure who withdraw 
resources from the public system will experience large increases in waiting times.  
As far as the authors are aware, this is the first study which uses administrative data to 
estimate demand and supply elasticities within the Italian context. We are only aware of 
another study which estimates demand elasticity for Italy (Fabbri and Monfardini, 2009). 
This study focuses on specialist consultations as opposed to elective surgeries. It makes use 
of survey in 2000 rather than recent administrative data. The methodology and period 
covered is different. We are also not aware of studies estimating demand and supply 
elasticities from other OECD countries (in addition to the UK) except for one study from 
Australia, which finds that demand of public hospitals is elastic to waiting times and equal to 
-1.7 (Stavrunova and Yerokhin, 2011). This may be explained by the large private sector 
which generates a more extensive margin between public and private provision compared to 
England. It also confirms that demand estimates can vary significantly across countries.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out the theoretical framework for the 
estimation of demand for and supply of elective surgeries in the Italian NHS. In Section 3 we 
briefly describe the institutional background and sources of data. Sections 4 and 5 describe 
empirical implementation and provide descriptive statistics. Section 6 contains empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes and discusses policy implications.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
We adopt the theoretical framework outlined by Martin and Smith (1999, 2003). We assume 
that waiting times act as a non-monetary price, which brings the demand for and the supply 
of elective surgery in equilibrium in a National Health System. The demand for publicly-
funded elective surgery is described by the following function and we include (in 
parentheses) the expected direction of each of the effects: 
                                                                             (1) 
Demand for publicly-funded surgery is assumed to decrease in waiting times. Longer waiting 
times may induce some patients at the margin to look for treatment in the private sector by 
paying out of pocket (or if they hold private health insurance) and therefore to opt out of the 
public system (i.e. the NHS). In addition, longer waits may induce some patients to substitute 
surgery with a pharmaceutical treatment therefore reducing demand for publicly-funded 
surgery.  
Demand for public treatment will be higher in areas with higher need, e.g. areas with an older 
and sicker population, and in areas where the quality of healthcare is higher making hospital 
services more attractive to patients (though quality is potentially endogenous if low demand 
reduces quality due to learning-by-doing effects). Similarly, private hospital availability is 
assumed to reduce demand for public treatment: smaller access costs to the private sector will 
induce some patients to switch from the public to the private sector (Martin and Smith, 2003; 
Martin et al., 2007). 
The supply of (publicly-funded) elective surgery is assumed to be determined by waiting time 
and local resources: 
                                     (2) 
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We assume that long waits induce the provider to increase the supply, for given level of 
inputs, for both altruistic and non-altruistic motivations. Doctors may be willing to work 
harder when waiting times are longer since they care about the patients. Waiting times are 
regularly used as performance indicators or targets for public providers (and for private 
providers treating publicly-funded patients). When waiting times are longer hospitals with a 
higher proportion of patients waiting longer than expected may be under tighter scrutiny from 
the regulator (Linsday and Feigenbaum,1984; Propper et al., 2008; Siciliani and Iversen, 
2012). Longer waits may also reduce idle capacity due to random patient arrivals, and 
therefore increase efficiency and the number of patients treated, though this effect is likely to 
be modest when waiting times are generally long (Iversen, 1997; Siciliani, Stanciole and 
Jacobs, 2009). Finally, the supply of care in a region is a function of its inputs, such as the 
number of available beds in publicly-funded hospitals and their personnel, which determine 
the overall capacity.  
  
3. Institutional background and data 
The Italian healthcare system is publicly funded with hospitals reimbursed by DRG according 
to volumes performed. The system is decentralised: Italy is divided in 19 regions and two 
autonomous provinces (Trento and Bolzano). The Italian National Health System was 
founded in 1978, provides full coverage to every citizen and is funded through national and 
regional taxation. In 2001 the Constitutional reform gave regions the freedom to choose the 
type of healthcare model, generating great variability in institutional arrangements across 
regions.  
Every region can decide its own organisational and regulatory scheme for public and private 
sector, how to allocate resources, define prevention and budgetary policies, strategic plans 
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(e.g. building new hospitals) and elective admission rules. To avoid excessive territorial 
disparities, the Italian Ministry of Health sets the Essential Levels of Assistance, which are 
minimum healthcare requirements that regions have to provide, whose compliance is 
annually verified by the national government. Heterogeneity in regional policies has emerged 
in relation to waiting times (Fattore et al., 2013) driven by differences in co-payment 
schemes, unified booking centres and promotion of private health insurance, providing a 
fragmented framework with regional disparities.  
There are similarities but also differences between the Italian and the English National Health 
Service. In England, to which most of the empirical literature refers to, hospitals are also paid 
by a DRG-type payment system (known as Healthcare Resources Groups, HRGs) and 
patients have choice of hospital. Patients are also heavily insured with no co-payments for 
surgery or specialist visits, and some co-payments for drugs. In both countries there are 
exemptions for persons with disabilities or chronic conditions, pregnant women, elderly and 
children (Paris et al., 2010). There are more pronounced differences between England and 
other health systems in the UK (e.g. Scotland and Wales) but arrangements vary less across 
different regions within England. In this respect, Italy has much more pronounced differences 
across regions in organisational arrangements and regulatory schemes.  
The proportion of private health expenditure is similar for both countries. The share of public 
health expenditure out of total health expenditure (at the beginning of our period of 
observation) was about 76.5% for Italy and 81.7% for the UK. Although the public-private 
mix is similar on the funding side, this is not the case on the hospital provision one. 96% of 
acute care beds in the UK is provided by public hospitals, while this is only 81.5% in Italy 
where 16.7% of the total number of acute beds is provided by not-for-profit private hospitals 
(Paris et al., 2010). 
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In this paper we use information on waiting times provided by the Italian Ministry of 
Health’s Statistical Office.10 Waiting times are available for 19 regions and the two 
autonomous provinces for several procedures during the period 2010-2014. Waiting times are 
calculated for elective publicly-funded patients who receive treatment in a public or private 
hospital. They are published annually in the Hospital Discharges Report (HDR) by the 
Ministry of Health.  
Waiting times are defined as the number of days elapsed between the time the patient has 
been added to a hospital waiting list for elective surgery and the day the patient is admitted to 
the hospital to receive the treatment. From the same source and for each year, region and 
procedure we collect data on hospital utilisation, i.e. the total number of elective and 
emergency discharges. Hospital utilisation rates are computed for each procedure as the ratio 
of the total number of discharges to the regional population in a given year. Hospital 
utilisation also refers to publicly-funded patients regardless of the type of provider (public or 
private) in which they receive treatment. The annual report for Hospital Discharges refers to 
patients treated in public hospitals and from the same source of data we calculate within each 
combination of region and year the overall share of patients treated in public hospitals paying 
with their own resources. The share is small and on average only about 2%, which is in line 
with findings as in Vittadini et al. (2012). 
We use data on waiting time for elective surgical (as opposed to medical) treatments since 
only these are available from administrative sources and are used as hospital targets. The ten 
procedures included in the HDR are: prostatectomy, breast cancer, colon cancer, uterus 
cancer and lung cancer surgeries, coronary bypass, percutaneous transluminal coronary 
                                                          
10
 Data are publicly available on the Italian Ministry of Health website (www.salute.gov.it) under Section “Temi 
e professioni” (Figures), subsections “Assistenza, ospedale e territorio” (Assistance, hospitals and local areas), 
“Ricoveri Ospedalieri” (Hospital discharges) and it is possible to select and download annual reports and data:   
www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1237&area=ricoveriOspedalieri&menu=vuoto   
We use the original data and no data cleaning was performed apart for the exclusions mentioned in this section.  
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angioplasty, carotid endarterectomy, hip replacement and tonsillectomy.
11
 We exclude 
tonsillectomy since regions show heterogeneous clinical attitudes and protocols which in turn 
reduce comparability across regions (Materia et al., 2005; see also national guidelines 
provided by the Italian Institute of Health for this clinical area
12
). We also compute the 
proportion of emergency discharges as the ratio between the number of emergency discharges 
and the total number of discharges by procedure, region and year. In summary, the HDR data 
used in this analysis vary along three dimensions: surgical procedure, region and year.  
Control variables are obtained from demographic indicators available from ISTAT (the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics), which vary only by year and region, not by procedure. 
They include number of residents, age distribution in the regional population and age and sex 
adjusted mortality rates. From the age distribution of residents, we calculate the proportion of 
population over 60 years old. We use risk-adjusted mortality rates and proportion of the 
elderly as a need indicators.  
As measure of local resources in the supply equation, we measure the capacity of private and 
public providers within each region. These are measured as (i) the total number of acute care 
beds in public and private hospitals (standardised by the number of residents); and (ii) the 
ratio between beds in private hospitals and total number of beds within each region. Private 
hospitals treat both publicly and privately-funded patients and our data do not allow to make 
a distinction whether the treatment is paid by the NHS or privately. Since regulatory policies 
vary across regions in relation to reimbursements to private providers, it is not possible to 
identify the number – or the proportion – of publicly-funded patients who are treated by the 
private sector. Therefore private hospitals contribute to the capacity available to publicly-
funded patients. Variable (ii) measures the public-private mix in provision in each region.  
                                                          
11
 Other six procedures have been added in 2011 but there are consistency issues across regions, which 
prevented their use here. 
12
 http://www.snlg-iss.it/pubblico_tonsillectomia_adenoidectomia  
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On the demand equation, we use control variables from the annual National Survey on 
Householders’  ifestyles, and compute the proportion of regional population smoking more 
than 11 cigarettes per day on the total number of smokers as a proxy of unhealthy behaviour. 
We use the C-section rate as a proxy of poor appropriateness of care, which is a form of 
quality. This is computed as the total number of C-section deliveries to the total number of 
births within each region, which is provided in the HDR by the Italian Ministry of Health. C-
section rates have been used by international organisations (OECD, 2015; WHO, 2015) as 
markers of appropriateness of care in health system performance. High C-section rates (on 
total births) are positively associated with complications and maternal and infant morbidity. 
According to the OECD, Italy has a surprisingly high C-section rate compared to other 
OECD countries although there are marked differences across regions, which we exploit in 
our analysis.  
To measure the availability of private supply to privately-funded patients, which could 
potentially reduce demand for public services, we measure the number of acute care beds in 
private hospitals (standardised by the number of residents).
13
 Ideally, we would have liked to 
measure the number of private hospital beds available to privately-funded patients, therefore 
excluding beds available to publicly-funded patients. Information on private beds is however 
available only at hospital level, and is not split between publicly- and privately-funded 
patients. 
We do not have information on the fraction of patients who die on the waiting list. However, 
the proportion of patients who are likely to die while on the waiting list is negligible for most 
of the elective procedures (e.g. hip replacement). Even for most of the more serious 
                                                          
13
 Beds refer to the number of beds available in each Region on the 1
st
 of January of each year. We only 
considered beds for elective patients, thus excluding beds for day cases and day surgeries. Source: Ministero 
della Salute - Dipartimento della programmazione e dell’ordinamento del Servizio sanitario nazionale - 
Direzione generale del sistema informativo e statistico sanitario; 
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conditions (e.g. cancer) elective patients experiencing a worsening of their health status are 
treated quickly or as emergencies.  
 
4. Econometric Specification 
We use linear models to estimate the impact of waiting times on the demand for and supply 
of surgical treatments. We estimate separate models for demand and supply. We assume that 
the system is in equilibrium and that demand     
  in equation (1) equates supply     
   in 
equation (2), so that      
      
      .  
The empirical specification of the demand equation is: 
           
       
      
             ,      (3) 
where subscript   indicates the type of elective surgery (e.g. hip replacement, surgeries for 
breast cancer etc., with,        ),   the region (with        ) ,   the year (with 
             ). Utilisation rate (    ) and waiting time (    ) are log-transformed so that 
the key coefficient of interest ( ) can be interpreted as the elasticity of demand with respect 
to waiting time. Utilisation rates are the total number of discharges for a given surgical 
procedure in a region and year standardised by population (the total number of residents, in 
thousands) of the region in the same year. 
The vector      includes control variables that vary over time, procedures and regions, such 
as the proportion of emergency discharges. The vector     includes variables which vary only 
over time and region and, in the demand equation, it includes the proportion of residents over 
60, smoking prevalence, age and sex adjusted mortality rates at time    , the number of 
private beds per capita and the C-section rate as indicator of poor quality.  
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The empirical model also includes time dummies    to capture common time trends and 
surgical procedure dummies    to control for differences in waiting times by procedure which 
amongst other factors reflect different degree of urgencies (e.g. cancer patients waiting less 
than hip replacement patients). We therefore exploit variations of waiting times across 
regions pooled across several years, controlling for the type of procedure, to identify the 
effect of waiting on demand.      is the error term.  
The empirical specification of the supply of elective surgery (    ) is analogous to equation 
(3) but uses a different set of controls (        ).      includes the proportion of emergency 
discharges.     includes the per capita number of acute beds in public and private hospitals 
and the proportion of beds in private hospitals on the total amount of available beds within 
each region.  
Since average waiting times in Italy are relatively short (about one month), we model demand 
for elective care as contemporaneously responding to waiting time, given the yearly 
frequency of the data used in the empirical analysis. We model the relation between supply 
and waiting time also as simultaneous since providers can quickly react to waiting time which 
they observe with no time lag, and are also aware that waiting time are annually assessed by 
the Ministry of Health. 
The ordinary least square estimation of equation (3), which again is estimated separately for 
the demand and supply equation, might produce a biased and inconsistent estimate of the 
coefficient of interest  . As mentioned above, longer waiting times may reduce demand for 
public treatment (because some patients opt for swifter private treatment) and also increase 
the supply of public treatments (due to targets or altruistic motives): therefore, waiting times 
are endogenous and have a simultaneous effect on both demand for and supply of treatment. 
Following previous literature (e.g. Martin and Smith, 1999, 2003), we instrument waiting 
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time in the supply equation with a selection of exogenous demand shifters and we instrument 
waiting time in the demand equation with a selection of exogenous supply shifters. As the 
latter proved to be weak instruments, we also used the lag of waiting time as an instrument in 
demand models.
14
 
To eliminate the remaining time-invariant unobservable factors, e.g. at regional level, that 
might simultaneously affect the dependent variable as well as the controls in the regression, 
we also estimated first-difference models. This specification will for example control for any 
time-invariant regional factor (e.g. proportion of individuals holding private insurance, which 
is unlikely to vary quickly over time). We prefer the first-difference models over the (region) 
fixed-effect models, since the latter require the strong exogeneity assumption,
15
 which is 
violated when we use the lag of waiting time as an instrument. Although the first-difference 
models are less efficient of fixed-effects ones they only require weak exogeneity (i.e. that 
there is no feedback from the idiosyncratic shocks today to a covariate or an instrument 
tomorrow). The first difference version of the previous model is: 
                                    
            
                      ,    (4) 
We estimate an analogous model for the supply (i.e.          
 ). 
To control for endogeneity caused in the demand model by the presence of waiting time, we 
instrument            with              . This is a valid instrument since 
                                                                      
                                                          
14
 This instrument is used also in Martin and Smith (2003). Admittedly, this is not an ideal instrument because 
persistency of waiting time over the years can cause the error term in the base equation to remain correlated, to 
some extent, with the instrument. 
15
 The within transformation of error term (       ) and of the log of waiting times (      ) are correlated 
through their means. 
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To check the validity of the instruments we use the F-statistic on the excluded instruments, 
both for robust and cluster standard errors, under the null of weak instruments. Following 
Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), we conclude that instruments are valid if the F-statistic is 
larger than 10.  
 
5. Descriptive Statistics  
We use data from nineteen Italian regions and two autonomous provinces for five years and 
nine surgical procedures.  Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for variables entering the 
supply and demand equations, respectively. Due to the presence of lagged variables in 
estimation procedure we report descriptive statistics for four years of observation (732 units – 
left hand side of Table 1) and for the last two years (366 units – right hand side of Table 1), 
which are respectively the maximum and minimum sample size used, depending on whether 
the lagged values of waiting time is used as instrument in the first-difference estimation.  
On average the per capita utilisation is of about 0.6 procedures per thousand residents, of 
which about 22% is emergency discharges. Waiting time is about 31 days across all 
procedures. The number of total beds for acute care per thousand residents is about 2.84 
whereas the availability of private beds per thousand residents is 0.48. The proportion of 
population over 60 years old is about 28% and the proportion of smokers who smoke more 
than 11 cigarettes per day is close to 40%. C-section rates are on average around 35% and 
adjusted mortality rate per thousand residents at time     is about 1%. The summary 
statistics are similar across the two samples used in the analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the average waiting time and utilisation rate for different procedures, at the 
beginning and at the end of the study period. It suggests that there is larger variability across 
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treatments than over time, with hip replacement procedures (Hip) having the longest wait.  
Lung and Uterus cancer surgeries, PTCA exhibit the shortest wait. Figure 2 shows that 
waiting times and utilisation rates exhibit high variability across regions both at the beginning 
and at the end of the period. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 2011-2014  2013-2014 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Utilisation rate (per 1000 
residents) 
732 0.60 0.65  366 0.61 0.67 
Waiting time (days) 732 31.33 0.55  366 30.87 0.53 
 
       
Demand shifters        
Emergency discharges (%) 732 21.64 22.44  366 22.86 22.95 
C-section rates (%) 732 35.09 9.45  366 34.77 9.24 
Heavy smokers (%) 732 39.59 4.59  366 38.46 4.62 
Population over 60 years old 
(%) 
732 27.75 2.66  366 28.00 2.60 
Private beds (per 1000 
residents) 
732 0.48 0.28  366 0.46 0.27 
Mortality rate (per 1000 
residents, at    ) 
732 10.29 1.26  366 10.21 1.23 
 
       
Supply shifters        
Emergency discharges (%) 732 21.64 22.44  366 22.86 22.95 
Beds (public and private, per 
1000 residents) 
732 2.84 0.29  366 2.73 0.28 
Private beds (%) 732 0.17 0.10  366 0.17 0.10 
Source: Our calculations using ISTAT and HDR data.  
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6. Empirical results  
In Table 2 we report the results for the demand equation. We first estimated the model in 
equation (3) using ordinary least squares (OLS) over the period 2011-14. The model includes 
year- and procedure-fixed effects and is reported in the first column. In line with previous 
literature (e.g. Martin and Smith, 2003) we first considered a cross-sectional specification, 
exploiting variability across procedures, regions and years. Given the likely endogeneity of 
waiting times, we estimate the same model with instrumental variables (IV), using as 
instrument the lagged value of waiting times. The model is reported in the second column. 
Because of the inclusion of the one-year lagged value of waiting time among controls of the 
demand model, we lose the first year of observations. Hence, we omit the first year from all 
estimation samples to maintain data consistency.  
Estimation results for the cross-sectional analysis show a negative and significant at 10% 
level coefficient for waiting time. The OLS estimation suggests an elasticity of demand to 
waiting time of -0.1, which increases (in absolute value) to -0.15 once waiting time is 
instrumented. In the third and fourth column of Table 2, we estimate the same models but 
restrict the sample to the last two years, to compare the results with those obtained in the 
first-difference (FD) specification (see model (4) above). In this restricted, hence less 
informative sample, the elasticity of waiting time coefficient loses statistical significance, but 
the magnitude of the coefficient remains similar. In the last two columns of Table 2, which 
uses FD estimation, we test whether the results for the demand equation are robust once 
controlling for time-invariant characteristics in the error term, which might be an additional 
source of endogeneity. The results show that the elasticity is equal to -0.04 using OLS and 
increases (in absolute value) to -0.24 with an IV estimation, which uses the 2-years-lagged 
difference in waiting times as an instrument, albeit statistical evidence is weak.  
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In relation to the control variables, we find that lower hospital quality (i.e. higher C-section 
rates) reduces demand. A higher proportion of emergency discharges and of heavy smokers 
(unhealthy lifestyle), both reduce the demand. Since the FD models control for time-invariant 
characteristics, the statistical significance of some control variables reduces. This is not the 
case for the emergency admission rate, which remains highly statistically significant.  
The F-statistics for the instrument used in the first stage regression show that the instrument 
is valid, even when FD models are used. In A1, Table A1 we report first-stage regressions, 
which show positive associations of waiting time over years, and of waiting time with 
population over 60, whereas the associations between waiting time and share of emergency 
discharges and C-section rate tend to be negative. In the first-difference model (Appendix 1, 
Table A1, third column) we find a negative coefficient of lagged waiting times, which is 
negative by construction as the autocorrelation coefficient for the change of waiting time is 
positive.
16
 
Table 3 contains results for the supply equation. Again, it presents first the OLS and then the 
IV estimation for each model. In the first two columns we present the pooled cross-sectional 
specification over the period 2011-14. Estimates show an elastic supply of elective surgery to 
waiting time only when waiting time is instrumented. Here, we use as instrument the 
proportion of population over 60 years old, which is a key driver of demand and exogenous 
to supply. The following two columns show that results are qualitatively similar when only 
observations in 2013-14 are used. In all pooled cross-sectional models the number of beds in 
public and private hospitals, measuring local endowments, has a positive and significant 
                                                          
16
 This follows from computing the correlation coefficient of                     , which has opposite sign 
with respect to the correlation coefficient of           . Intuitively, assuming for simplicity a simple 
autoregressive model for our first stage regression, the sign of the autocorrelation coefficient, 
                     is given by the covariance                       Under weak stationarity            
  for all integer values of  ,h and                              
 . This implies that for a positive 
autocorrelation coefficient    , from which follows that the sign of                      is negative. 
Relevant proof is in Appendix 3. 
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coefficient, suggesting that the higher capacity increases supply. A higher rate of emergency 
discharges reduces the supply for elective interventions, since emergency discharges require 
more stand-by capacity. The results are robust to the use of alternative instruments, including 
C-section rates. All instruments are valid in the cross-sectional models and first-stage results 
are presented in Appendix 1, Table A2.  
In the last four columns of Table 3 we report estimation results for first-difference estimates, 
which controls for time-invariant characteristics. The waiting time coefficients are still 
positive but smaller and not statistically significant. Given the aggregate nature of our data, 
the lack of statistical significance might be due to the loss of information caused by the first 
difference transformation. Moreover, all instruments used are weak and vary only by region 
and year.  
Other factors should ideally be included in the demand equation, such as (average) distance 
to the hospital or co-payments, which are likely to deter some patients and reduce demand. A 
variable capturing the average distance would require detailed access to patient level data and 
geographical coordinates between patients’ residence and hospital address. We conjecture the 
bias caused by the omission of these variables is likely to be negligible in our first-difference 
model which controls for time-invariant factors including regional effects. The average 
distance to hospital is unlikely to have changed significantly over time. 
We check the robustness of our findings on the demand side excluding the variable that is 
related to smoking prevalence. Coefficients and significance levels are similar to the one 
presented in base model at the cost of losing estimate precision in the waiting time coefficient 
for the pooled IV cross-section (see Appendix 1, Table A3).  
As a robustness check of the supply equation estimation, we also measure the per capita cost 
of medical staff (wages) in public hospitals as an additional input in the production function 
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of publicly-funded treatments. The results are very similar in terms of magnitude and 
significance of coefficients (see Appendix 1, Table A4), though the power of the instruments 
is marginally reduced due to the high correlation between wages and beds (equal to 0.9). 
The small sample size does not allow us to perform sensitivity analysis by intervention type.  
Nonetheless we test the robustness of our results by excluding from the sample procedures 
with more than 40% of emergency discharges (i.e. percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty whose fraction of emergency discharges is 67%), and we found similar pointwise 
estimates, though with some precision loss. Results are in tables A5 and A6 of Appendix 1.  
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Table 2: Demand estimates 
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference 
 
2011 – 14 2013 – 14  2013 – 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV 
               
Waiting time (log) -0.102* -0.149* -0.045 -0.128  -0.04* -0.238* 
 
(0.060) (0.086) (0.067) (0.105)  (0.023) (0.142) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.016***  -0.002** -0.004** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.001) 
C-section rates (%) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.016***  -0.006 -0.016 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.051) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.018 0.021 -0.004 0.003  0.004 -0.012 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.041)  (0.045) (0.057) 
Proportion of heavy smokers (%) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.015***  0.000 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.047 0.050 0.041 0.047  0.054 0.05 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035)  (0.056) (0.061) 
Mortality rate (per 1000  0.029 0.024 0.057 0.049  -0.01 -0.028 
residents, at    ) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069)  (0.019) (0.024) 
Constant 6.078*** 6.175*** 6.002*** 6.147***  -0.009 -0.002 
 
(0.509) (0.513) (0.576) (0.561)  (0.013) (0.0159) 
     
 
  Observations 732 732 366 366  366 366 
R-squared 0.902 
 
0.9 
 
 0.025 
 First stage F-stat   196.7   116.3    11.15 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-sectional 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument used in pooled cross-
section models is the 1-year-lagged waiting time; in the first difference specification it includes 2-years-lagged values of first differences. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered 
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Table 3: Supply estimates 
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference First-difference 
 
2011 – 14 2013 – 14  2011 – 14 2013 – 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
                 
Waiting time (log) 0.010 1.069*** 0.079 0.718***  0.025 0.627* -0.036 0.176 
 
(0.057) (0.354) (0.057) (0.237)  (0.045) (0.360) (0.022) (0.206) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.010*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.016**  0.001 0.003 -0.002** -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) 1.567*** 1.313*** 1.408*** 1.124***  0.018 0.382 -0.085 0.009 
 
(0.314) (0.416) (0.352) (0.386)  (0.220) (0.373) (0.193) (0.233) 
Private beds  (%) -0.399* -0.203 -0.116 0.092  0.100 -0.379 0.367 0.591 
 
(0.237) (0.362) (0.213) (0.287)  (0.696) (1.130) (0.461) (0.556) 
Constant -7.041*** -8.416** -5.902** -5.732*  0.006 0.002 -0.013 -0.011 
 
(2.537) (3.323) (2.811) (2.981)  (0.025) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
   
   
    Observations 732 732 366 366  732 732 366 366 
R-squared 0.887 
 
0.896   0.001  0.021  
First stage F-stat   14.04   18.90    4.439   2.622 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-section 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section 
models includes proportion of population over 60 years old; in the first-difference specifications it also includes C-section rates. Robust and clustered 
standard errors computed. 
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7. Conclusions and policy implications 
We have used administrative data on waiting times and volume of elective surgeries across 
different procedures and regions in Italy over the period 2010-2014. Our key finding suggests 
that the demand for elective surgery is inelastic to waiting times, and the elasticity is in the 
range of -0.15 and -0.24. This is in line with the literature in England (Martin and Smith, 
1999, 2003; Martin et al. 2007), which provides a comparable demand elasticity of -0.2. The 
statistical significance of our results is however weaker and this is likely to be due to our use 
of aggregated data at regional level as opposed to electoral ward and a shorter time series 
used in the English context (Martin and Smith, 2003, 2007).  
The similar elasticity between Italy and the UK could be the result of the similarities between 
health systems (both with a National Health Service, similar public-private funding mix, and 
financial arrangements for hospitals). But there are also differences (such as the differences in 
public-private mix in hospital provision) and a priori elasticities could have been different. 
The importance of different institutional arrangements across health systems is indeed 
confirmed by the different demand elasticity for Australia, which has been estimated at -1.7 
(Stavrunova and Yerokhin, 2011). This is because, in Australia, the public-private mix is very 
different on the funding side, with more than half of the population holding private health 
insurance and therefore more susceptible to switch from the public to the private sector when 
waiting times are longer.  
Although our study suggests a weak effect of waiting times on demand, the results have 
important policy implications in relation to the effectiveness of policy initiatives that 
encourage an expansion in supply to reduce waiting times (through more funding, an 
extension of working hours, revision of contracts, contracting out to existing private 
providers etc.). Some policymakers have argued that such supply-side policy initiatives can 
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be ineffective since an increase in supply can be offset by large increases in demand (Hurst 
and Siciliani, 2005). Whether there are merits to this argument depends critically on the 
demand elasticity to waiting times. Our results show that within the Italian institutional 
context the demand is inelastic. Therefore, policies aimed at increasing supply would be 
effective in reducing waiting times.  
At times of great financial pressure following the economic crisis, governments have 
introduced or are introducing measures to keep health expenditure under control, which is 
likely to imply a reduction or a slower growth in supply. Driven by the ageing population and 
technology, the gap between demand and supply may increase and, based on our findings, so 
will waiting times and waiting lists. Governments therefore need to consider policy 
interventions which act on the demand, for example by reducing unnecessary referrals 
through better coordination between GPs and specialists (Mariotti et al., 2014) or improving 
the prioritisation of the list to minimise the impact of delays (Siciliani, Borowitz and Moran, 
2013). 
Health systems differ to a great extent across the OECD countries on funding, provision and 
organisational arrangements. As data on waiting times become increasingly available, future 
work could replicate our analysis in other health systems to inform the policy debate on 
supply-side initiatives aimed at reducing waiting times.  
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Appendix 1: Additional results. 
Table A1. First Stage Estimates; Demand Equation. 
  
Pooled  
cross-section 
Pooled  
cross-section 
First- 
difference 
Variables 2011 – 14 2013 – 14 2013 – 14 
        
Waiting time (log) at t-1 0.653*** 0.610***  
 
(0.047) (0.057)  
Waiting time (log) at t-2    -0.181*** 
   (0.054) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.005*** 0.002 -0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
C-section rate (%) 0.001 -0.005** -0.025* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Proportion of heavy smokers (%) -0.000 0.004 0.008** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.040*** 0.052*** -0.075 
 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.103) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.012 0.039** -0.042 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.129) 
Mortality rate (per 1000 residents, at    ) -0.047* -0.063** -0.076* 
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.044) 
Constant 0.447* 0.228 0.036 
 
(0.250) (0.329) (0.030) 
    Observations 732 366 366 
R-squared 0.798 0.824 0.109 
The dependent variable is waiting time and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all specifications 
we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. Robust and clustered standard errors computed.  
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Table A2. First Stage Estimates; Supply Equation. 
  
Pooled  
cross-section 
Pooled  
cross-section 
First- 
difference 
First- 
difference 
 2011 – 14 2013 – 14 2011 – 14 2013 – 14 
          
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.050 -0.045 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.059) (0.106) 
C-section rate (%)   -0.028*** -0.033** 
   (0.011) (0.015) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.010*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) -0.040 0.148 -0.586 -0.243 
 
(0.243) (0.222) (0.503) (0.463) 
Private beds (%) 0.171 0.138 1.471 0.030 
 
(0.254) (0.258) (1.038) (1.245) 
Constant 2.399 0.626 -0.024 0.002 
 
(1.881) (1.674) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
  
  Observations 732 366 732 366 
R-squared 0.590 0.637 0.037 0.062 
The dependent variable is waiting time and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In all specifications 
we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section models 
includes proportion of over 60 years old in the population, in first-difference specifications it also includes low hospital quality measured by C-section rate. 
Robust and clustered standard errors computed. 
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Table A3. Robustness check: Demand estimates without fraction oh heavy smokers among Demand controls. 
  Pooled cross-section 
Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
Pooled cross-section 
Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
  First-difference 
Estimation period: 
2013 – 14 
  Variables OLS IV OLS IV 
 
OLS IV 
                
Waiting time (log) -0.077 -0.101 -0.028 -0.07 
 
-0.040* -0.243* 
 
(0.059) (0.085) (0.067) (0.103) 
 
(0.023) (0.146) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
-0.002** -0.004** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
C-section rates (%) -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 
-0.006 -0.012 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.006) (0.008) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) 0.051 0.054 0.021 0.026 
 
0.005 -0.008 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) 
 
(0.044) (0.049) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.047 0.049 0.050 0.053 
 
0.054 0.051 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
(0.056) (0.061) 
Mortality rate (per 1000  -0.024 -0.027 0.022 0.017 
 
-0.010 -0.028 
residents, at    ) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) (0.075) 
 
(0.019) (0.025) 
Constant 4.776*** 4.807*** 4.926*** 4.980*** 
 
-0.010 -0.006 
 
(0.516) (0.510) (0.587) (0.571) 
 
(0.012) (0.014) 
        Observations 732 732 366 366 
 
366 366 
R-squared 0.898 
 
0.897 
  
0.024 
 First stage F-stat   196.6   109.9     10.62 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-sectional 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument used in pooled cross-
section models is the 1-year-lagged waiting time; in the first difference specification it includes 2-years-lagged values of first differences. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered. 
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Table A4. Robustness check: Supply estimates including wages per capita.  
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference First-difference 
 
Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 – 14 
 Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 – 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
 
         
Waiting time (log) -0.016 1.126** 0.063 0.739***  0.022 0.596* -0.038* 0.160 
 
(0.056) (0.443) (0.057) (0.269)  (0.045) (0.356) (0.022) (0.193) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.011*** -0.000 -0.018*** -0.016**  0.001 0.003 -0.002** -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) 1.778*** 1.238** 1.503*** 1.092**  -0.061 0.324 -0.107 -0.005 
 
(0.333) (0.489) (0.370) (0.430)  (0.235) (0.398) (0.194) (0.235) 
Private beds  (%) -0.465** -0.174 -0.165 0.110  0.416 -0.195 0.558 0.636 
 
(0.233) (0.394) (0.207) (0.300)  (0.711) (1.181) (0.491) (0.543) 
Wages (log) -0.064*** 0.019 -0.037 0.010  0.706** 0.361 0.356 0.115 
 
(0.022) (0.048) (0.026) (0.035)  (0.328) (0.517) (0.316) (0.418) 
Constant -8.290*** -8.105** -6.400** -5.599*  0.005 0.002 -0.012 -0.011 
 
(2.617) (3.491) (2.887) (3.115)  (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) 
   
   
    Observations 732 732 366 366  732 732 366 366 
R-squared 0.890 
 
0.897   0.005 -0.492 0.024 -0.189 
First stage F-stat   9.310   14.31    4.106   2.904 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-section 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section 
models includes proportion of population over 60 years old; in the first-difference specifications it also includes C-section rates. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered. 
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Table A5. Robustness check: Demand estimates excluding PTCA.  
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference 
 
Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 – 14 
 Estimation period:  
2013 – 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV 
               
Waiting time (log) -0.086 -0.160* -0.031 -0.120  -0.021 -0.255 
 
(0.065) (0.093) (0.075) (0.111)  (0.026) (0.332) 
Emergency admissions (%) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.016** -0.017***  -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.002) 
C-section rates (%) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.017***  -0.007 -0.011 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.009) 
Proportion of over 60 years old (%) -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.016***  0.000 0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.003) 
Proportion of heavy smokers (%) 0.021 0.026 -0.001 0.006  -0.008 -0.024 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.044)  (0.049) (0.059) 
Private beds (per 1000 residents) 0.043 0.047 0.039 0.045  0.066 0.058 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039)  (0.062) (0.069) 
Mortality rate (per 1000  0.025 0.021 0.053 0.046  -0.014 -0.036 
residents, at    ) (0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076)  (0.021) (0.038) 
Constant 6.081*** 6.238*** 5.996*** 6.154***  -0.010 -0.001 
 
(0.553) (0.556) (0.636) (0.615)  (0.014) (0.020) 
 
       
Observations 650 650 325 325  325 325 
R-squared 0.870 0.870 0.865 0.864  0.026 -0.214 
First stage F-stat   190   112    2.469 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-sectional specifications 
we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument used in pooled cross-section models is the 1-year-lagged 
waiting time; in the first difference specification it includes 2-years-lagged values of first differences. Standard errors are robust and clustered  
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Table A6. Robustness check: Supply estimates excluding PTCA.  
  Pooled cross-section Pooled cross-section  First-difference First-difference 
 
Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 – 14 
 Estimation period:  
2011 – 14 
Estimation period:  
2013 – 14 
Variables OLS IV OLS IV  OLS IV OLS IV 
                 
Waiting time (log) 0.038 1.088*** 0.098 0.758***  -0.004 0.617 -0.015 0.427 
 
(0.059) (0.376) (0.063) (0.258)  (0.036) (0.394) (0.026) (0.462) 
Emergency discharges (%) -0.012*** -0.005 -0.019*** -0.017**  -0.002 -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Beds (public and private, per 1000 residents) 1.673*** 1.439*** 1.521*** 1.262***  0.145 0.492 -0.075 0.087 
 
(0.347) (0.447) (0.390) (0.425)  (0.206) (0.365) (0.213) (0.336) 
Private beds  (%) -0.466* -0.284 -0.149 0.042  0.294 0.009 0.374 1.038 
 
(0.258) (0.394) (0.236) (0.316)  (0.740) (1.125) (0.508) (0.980) 
Constant -7.952*** -9.447*** -6.846** -6.941**  0.002 -0.003 -0.016 -0.015 
 
(2.793) (3.562) (3.119) (3.289)  (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
   
   
    Observations 650 650 325 325  650 650 325 325 
R-squared 0.851 0.699 0.861 0.808  0.010 -1.611 0.021 -0.861 
First stage F-stat   12.64   16.67    2.779   0.956 
The dependent variable is utilisation rate and standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In cross-section 
specifications we also include year and procedure dummy variables, whose estimated coefficients are omitted here. The instrument set in pooled cross-section 
models includes proportion of population over 60 years old; in the first-difference specifications it also includes C-section rates. Robust and clustered 
standard errors computed.  
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Appendix 2. Data sources.  
We download from Italian Ministry of Health website Annual report on Hospital Discharges 
for years 2010-2014. Data are free and the Ministry of Health does not require any special 
permission for access. Data are available in xls format. 
For year 2014 the relevant file is: 
 “C_1 _pubblicazioni_2396_ulterioriallegati_ulterioreallegato_0_alleg” and data on waiting 
times are in tables 3.10 – 3.10(5). We use the total number of discharges (“Totale 
dimisisoni”) and the relative average of waited time (in days, “Attesa media in giorni”). 
For year 2013 the relevant file is: 
 “C_1 _tavole_18_allegati_iitemAllegati_0_fileAllegati_itemFile_1_file” and data on 
waiting times are in tables 3.10 – 3.10(5). We use the total number of discharges (“Totale 
dimisisoni”) and the relative average of waited time (in days, “Attesa media in giorni”). 
For year 2012 the relevant file is: 
 “C_1 _tavole_16_allegati_iitemAllegati_0_fileAllegati_itemFile_1_file” and data on 
waiting times are in tables 3.10 – 3.10(5). We use the total number of discharges (“Totale 
dimisisoni”) and the relative average of waited time (in days, “Attesa media in giorni”). 
For year 2011 the relevant file is: 
 “C_1 _tavole_1_allegati_iitemAllegati_0_fileAllegati_itemFile_11_file” and data on 
waiting times are in tables 3.10 – 3.10(5). We use the total number of discharges (“Totale 
dimisisoni”) and the relative average of waited time (in days, “Attesa media in giorni”). 
For year 2010 the relevant file is: 
 “C_1 _pubblicazioni_1690_ulterioriallegati_ulterioreallegato_0_alleg” and data on waiting 
times are in tables 3.10 – 3.10(5). We use the total number of discharges (“Totale 
dimisisoni”) and the relative average of waited time (in days, “Attesa media in giorni”). 
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Appendix 3.  
Proof:   
                                                              
+                               
                                    
                                               
                                                     
                                   
                                           
                                               
                  
                                                                     
                                                 
                                                       
                                             
                  
                                                  
                                 
If 
                , 
                      
 , 
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Substituting          we obtain  
                                  
                     
          
Given that             (and          ⇔     ) the sign of the correlation is 
given by –   
Recall that          
                                 
              
              
  
q.e.d. 
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